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A COURT OF CLERKS, NOT OF MEN:' SERVING
JUSTICE2 IN THE MEDIA AGE 3
INTRODUCTION
For most of your lives, you've been running a never-ending race to
succeed. Let me tell you something I hope you'll take seriously.
The race is over. You've won. You are law clerks of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
[Y]ou represent the best and the brightest of the legal community
.... After screening thousands of applications from the country's
top law schools, the justices of this Court selected you. What does
that mean? It means your lives are forever changed. Recruiters will
offer you jobs, headhunters will take you out to expensive dinners,
and potential employers will do everything in their power to hire
you. You are members of the country's most elite fraternity. The
current secretary of state was a Supreme Court clerk. So was the
secretary of defense. Three of our nine Supreme Court justices
were former Supreme Court clerks, which means that someone in
this room has a pretty good shot at becoming a Supreme Court jus-
tice. From this moment on, you are the hottest property on the
board. You're Boardwalk and Park Place. And that means you
have power.
This is an important job-probably more important than any job
you'll ever have. For over two hundred years, the Supreme Court
has steered our country through its greatest controversies. Con-
gress may pass the laws, and the president may sign the laws, but it's
the Supreme Court that decides the law. And starting today, that
power is yours. Alongside the justices, you will draft decisions that
change lives. Your input will constantly be sought, and your ideas
will certainly be implemented. In many instances, the justices will
rely entirely on your analysis. They'll base their opinions on your
research. That means you affect what they see and what they know.
There are nine justices on this Court. But your influence, the power
that you hold, makes you the tenth justice.4
1. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (philosophizing that
we have "'a government of laws and not of men"'). See also infra note 34 (commenting on the
historic lack of women hired for clerkships).
2. J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW (1974).
3. Steve France, A Penchant For Privacy: Court Discourages Advocates Angling For Openness,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1998, at 38, 38-39 (stating that the fact that the Supreme Court has escaped the
"media-saturated celebrity culture" is "a little magic trick that gets more amazing every year").
4. BRAD MELTZER, THE TENTH JUSTICE 3-4 (1997).
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Judicial clerks have been criticized for inflating their importance
within the judicial milieu. Nevertheless, clerks have been influential
in judicial decision-making, certainly to a significant degree. Finding
to what degree has inspired a body of literature about clerk participa-
tion in the judicial process. Tales of the role of judicial clerks reside in
various mediums, including case law, law review volumes, newspaper
articles, and both fiction and non-fiction books. The crescendo of de-
bate concerning clerks mirrors their prominence in history, increasing
steadily throughout the years.5
Justice Louis Brandeis believed unelected United States Supreme
Court Justices commanded public respect because they "do their own
work."' 6 However, there has been a slow fade of the romantic images
of a Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes or a Judge Learned Hand laboring
in solitude to handcraft an eloquently written opinion to endure the
ages. Today, clerks often take up their judge's pen.7 Coinciding with
this delegation of judicial responsibility to clerks has been the desire
to peer behind the mysterious curtain of judicial chambers. Particu-
larly, the increased addition of these young, ambitious lawyers to the
Supreme Court-town has fanned society's curiosity. 8
In American practice, a judge, in part, is a wordsmith. Jurists study
the stories of the interested parties, examine the law related to their
complaints, and use that law, public policy, and their life experiences
to determine an appropriate outcome. All of these steps in the deci-
sion-making process are significant. The judge's written product is of
equal significance because it endures. In modern times, the legal pro-
fession has come to rely on written opinions to effectively serve their
clients.9 Indeed, written opinions are one of the primary sources an
5. See JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN AMERICAN
COURTS 2 (1980) ("Writing about law clerks, like writing about sex, has only recently become
respectable.").
6. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 201 (1958).
7. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
8. The Supreme Court has recently been described by a former clerk as a "minisociety unto
itself, not unlike a small town-insular, intensely private .... EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 24 (1998). See Robert Marquand, Junior Scribes of High Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, July 13, 1998, at 1 (stating that the Supreme Court clerks and Justices are "all inside a
hermetically sealed federal building where the work is shrouded in secrecy").
9. Early on in our nation's history, the question "was not who wrote the decisions but whether
they were written at all." WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 31 (1996). The
Supreme Court did not issue written opinions on a regular basis until the appointment of Chief
Justice John Marshall. Id.
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attorney has to work with-all of it crafted within judicial chambers. 10
As mentioned, in many instances it appears that clerks are the original
authors of the opinions published in the United States Reports. This
has moved critics to question whether opinion-writing bestows upon
clerks a responsibility too great. While an array of responses have
been proposed, one theme is common-the position of a clerk within
the judicial-town is an institution unlikely to die in the near future."
At the most, this Comment's purpose is to encourage judges, specif-
ically the nine Justices of the Supreme Court,12 to reclaim the respon-
sibility of writing opinions; at a minimum, it is to inspire clerks to
rethink their role in the media age. Heavy dockets may make opin-
ion-writing by judges wholly impractical. However, judges who defer
to their clerk's pen must maintain a clear set of limits to ensure a
proper image for the courts. When judges fail to take affirmative
steps, clerks themselves must confine their efforts to better serve the
consumers of court opinions, namely practitioners, historians and judi-
cial biographers, and the public.
Part I of this Comment outlines the historical evolution of the clerk
and considers the functions of judicial opinion-writing in society. 13
Part II discusses why judges have relinquished their dominance in
opinion-writing, how clerks should handle their duties, and why the
law's consumers should be concerned about clerk opinion-writing.14
Through examining the tasks judges delegate to clerks, society can be-
gin to define tolerable parameters for clerkships. In light of the con-
cerns that practitioners, historians, and the public should have about
clerks, Part III assesses the impact clerks will continue to have on soci-
10. A glimpse at The Bluebook informs users that "[c]ertain kinds of authorities are consid-
ered more useful-or authoritative-than other kinds" and that "[i]f more than one authority is
cited in support of a proposition, these supporting authorities are usually listed so that the more
authoritative ones appear first." THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 5 (16th ed.
1996). Cases fall in line after "Constitutions," "Statutes," and "Treaties." Id. at 25. But see
Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1986) (accusing
The Bluebook of being "part of the surprising juvenscence of the legal profession; students study
the laws laid down by other students, and teachers teach the law laid down by their just-gradu-
ated students, the judges' law clerks").
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 158 (1996)
[hereinafter CHALLENGE AND REFORM]; David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relation-
ships With Their Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 236, 238 (1986). For information about clerking at the
Supreme Court, see Guide to Law Clerks and Clerking at the U.S. Supreme Court (visited Oct. 6,
1999) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/clerk.htm>.
12. Out of necessity, the focus of this Comment hinges on the functioning of the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's place in the structure of the judicial system, coupled with
the multitude of information it generates, were considerations in choosing this lens. However,
many of the issues discussed touch, at least minimally, on all court levels, both state and federal.
13. See infra notes 16-198 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 199-308 and accompanying text.
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ety and how judges and clerks may adjust their practices to halt the
unintended consequences of the media age.15
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History Of The Clerk
1. An Institution Is Born
In 1875, Horace Gray, then Chief Justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, began hiring highly-ranked, recent Harvard Law
School graduates as clerks. 16 When Gray was appointed to the United
States Supreme Court in 1882, he continued the practice. 17 Justice
Gray paid his clerks' salaries out of his own pocket. 18 Not until the
1922 Appropriation Act did Congress authorize each Justice to em-
ploy one clerk at an annual salary of $3,600.19 In 1924, the law clerk
position at the Supreme Court became permanent.20 Scholars have
correlated the introduction of clerks with the burgeoning docket
which began to overwhelm the Court.21 States soon mimicked the
Supreme Court's practice, and by 1942, approximately fifty percent of
top state courts employed clerks.22
As the caseload of the Supreme Court expanded, so did the number
of clerks. 23 A Supreme Court clerk's early responsibilities included
serving as a secretary, an assistant, and sometimes a chauffeur.2 4 Over
time, clerks were transformed into an invaluable screen of informa-
tion for the increasingly busy Justice. 25 Today, each of the nine
Supreme Court Justices has the liberty to hire as many as four law
clerks per October Term.26 Including the Supreme Court, there are
15. See infra notes 309-322 and accompanying text.
16. See Martha Swann, Clerks of the Justices, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 159 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 160.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1133
(1973); Chester A. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40
OR. L. REV. 299, 301 (1961).
22. See OAKLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 18.
23. See id. at 21.
24. "One clerk was recommended to one Justice for his skills as a barber." John G. Kester,
The Law Clerk Explosion, LITIG., Spring 1983, at 20, 22. Perhaps the days of acting as chauffeur
are not yet over. See United States v. Velasquez-Carbona, 991 F.2d 574, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that it was not prejudicial to the case for a law clerk to drive a juror to the bus stop after
arguments ran late on the final day of a trial).
25. See Baier, supra note 21, at 1163-71.
26. See Crump, supra note 11, at 238.
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approximately one thousand federal judgeships.2 7 The federal system
employs over two thousand clerks to assist these judges with their im-
portant work.28
Federal judges have complete discretion in selecting their elbow
clerks. Hundreds of applications flood chambers each year, the exact
number depending on the judge and his or her place in the judicial
hierarchy. 29 Judges vie for clerks who are "superstars. '30 The clerk
selection process has been described as an "undignified" 31 and
"demeaning"32 "frenzied mating ritual. '33 The chosen few have con-
sistently been alumni of the most prestigious schools34 and have grad-
27. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: Acrv-
ITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 6 (1990).
28. See id.
29. Some judges have a reputation as a "feeder" judge, which means the individuals they hire
as clerks generally go on to clerk for a Supreme Court Justice. LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 19.
30. "When it comes to hiring law clerks, there is no collegiality." David Margolick, At the
Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash with Judicial Decorum Left in the Dust, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1989, at B4. One student commented, "[the clerkship process] was positively
surreal, the most ludicrous thing I've ever been through.... Here are these brilliant, respected
people - they're Federal judges for God's sake - and they're behaving like 6-year olds." Id. For a
more complete foray into the rigorous debate surrounding the clerk selection process, see, for
example, Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707 (1991) (arguing that
reform is unnecessary because the free market system elicits the finest candidates); Abner J.
Mikva, Judicial Clerkships: A Judge's View, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 150, 152 (1986) ("I think some of
my colleagues are frequenting maternity wards to make sure they get the 'best' clerks."); Tren-
ton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship Selection Process: An Applicant's Perspective on Bad Ap-
ples, Sour Grapes, and Fruitful Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 765 (1993) (contributing to the
argument that the medical model would reduce costs and increase information in clerk selec-
tion); Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection: A Reply to the Bad
Apple, 101 YALE L. REV. 1097 (1992) (replying to Kozinski's article to argue that the medical
model would bring more respect to the otherwise demeaning selection process); Patricia M.
Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152 (1990) (advocating that judges should reform
the clerk selection process to model medical matching programs).
31. See Wald, supra note 30, at 156.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 152 (citing Margolick, supra note 30, at B4).
34. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1995) ("[I]n the 1993 term, three-
quarters of the clerks had degrees from four law schools (Yale, Chicago, Stanford, and
Harvard)."). In the 1960s, 56% of the Supreme Court's clerks had attended Harvard, Yale, or
Stanford. Mark R. Brown, Gender Discrimination In The Supreme Court's Clerkship Selection
Process, 75 OR. L. REV. 359, 369 n.43 (1986). In the 1970s, 51% were graduates of Harvard,
Yale, Stanford, or Virginia. Id. In the 1980s, 52% were alumni of Harvard, Yale, Chicago, or
Columbia. Id. The 1990s have witnessed 60% of clerks from Harvard, Yale, or Chicago. Id.
The few number of women chosen to clerk has been a source of debate. Justice William
Douglas hired Lucille Lomen to clerk in 1944, probably due to the impact on America's work
force during the Second World War. Id. at 362. Another female clerk was not hired until 1966
when Justice Hugo Black hired Margaret J. Corcoran. Id. at 363. Amazingly, during the revolu-
tionary 1960s, only two of the 169 clerks hired by the Supreme Court were female. Id. Even
Justice William Brennan, known for his defense of minorities, never hired a female clerk until
the last two years he sat on the Court. See Marquand, supra note 8, at 1. See also Pamela S.
Karlan, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 HARV. L. REV. 13, 19 n.29 (1994) (finding
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uated at the top of their class. 35 Most Supreme Court clerks have
served a lower federal court judge for at least one year before a tour
of duty at the Court.36 Completing a clerkship, particularly at the
Supreme Court, translates into substantially enhanced career
opportunities. 37
that Justice Harry Blackmun hired 32 female law clerks by the time of his retirement-more
than any other Justice at that time); Sylvia A. Law, Good Intentions are Not Enough: An Agenda
on Gender for Law School Deans, 77 IOWA L. REV. 79, 84 n.16 (1991) (arguing that the clerkship
selection process fosters predominantly white male mentoring networks between judges, former
clerks, and law professors); Richard C. Reuben, Not 'Year of the Woman' For Supreme Court
Clerks, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 6, 1992, at 2 (reporting that the Supreme Court hired the least
number of female clerks during that term compared to the rest of the decade). See generally
Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting a magistrate as saying, "'I
don't think that any female law clerk is going to give me a lot of input on how to decide a
case'").
Furthermore, Supreme Court critics have noted that relying on these few schools for clerks
has caused there to be only a small number of minority clerks. See Linn Washington, Jr., Bring-
ing More Blacks To Clerking, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 60, 60. One commentator wrote:
Fatina Purdie is something of an anomaly among those who clerk for federal judges.
Neither male nor white, she attended neither Harvard, Yale nor any other top-20 law
school.
[Perhaps many] factors [have] led to the current, dismally low number of minorities
holding judicial clerkships.
Despite disagreement over the role of racism in Court hiring practices, many on both
sides of this issue share the belief that justices do discriminate by favoring applicants
from a few elite law schools ....
Id. at 60-61. See Frank H. Wu, Examining The Supreme Court's Clerkship, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19,
1998, at 31 (reporting that thousands gathered on the steps of the Supreme Court to protest the
lack of minority clerks).
35. See BAUM, supra note 34, at 18. "They are the top of the top 1 percent in law school. Ivy
Leaguers, more often than not. Best grades. Best recommendations. Top guns of the emerging
generation of legal minds. Constitutional Wunder-kinder, cocky and sure." Marquand, supra
note 8, at 1.
36. See BAUM, supra note 34, at 18.
37. See Kozinski, supra note 30, at 1709 (instructing that a "young lawyer's choice of a clerk-
ship can have a significant impact on his further career development"); Stewart Maculay, The
Judge as Mentor: A Personal Memoir, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 144, 144 (1986) ("There is a mythical
picture of a judicial clerkship that floats in the culture of American law schools."); J. Daniel
Mahoney, Forward: Law Clerks-For Better or For Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1988)
(revealing that the "most prestigious law firm" and "teaching jobs and government positions"
are open to clerks); Norris, supra note 30, at 769 (noting that a clerkship is an important creden-
tial for teaching because almost two-thirds of Harvard's tenure-track faculty once clerked for
federal judges); Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 30, at 1100 (lamenting that "[s]tudents should
not want to clerk merely for prestige and access to future career opportunities ... [but should
want to clerk] as an opportunity for public service"); Karen O'Connor & John R. Hermann, The
Clerk Connection: Appearances Before The Supreme Court By Former Law Clerks, 78 JUDICA-
TURE 247, 247 (1995) (writing that law firms have a "yearly competition to sign clerks that ri-
val[s] the NBA draft"); Wald, supra note 30, at 155 (stating that the small number of clerkships
available make them crucial to certain careers in law, such as teaching); Joan Biskupic, Clerks
Gain Status, Clout In The 'Temple' of Justice, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1994, at Al (revealing that
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Historically, the relationship between judge and clerk has been a
very close one. 38 A bond forms because of the intensity of working
together on complex issues as well as from the deep need for complete
confidentiality and trust. Confidentiality and trust are necessary for
the judge-clerk relationship to effectively function.39 Clerks become
so intertwined with their judge that clerks have enjoyed absolute im-
munity when their actions are determined to be part of the judicial
function.40 However, on occasion, a clerk's actions have been found
to undermine the propriety of a judge's decision-making capacity.41
As a result, judges have had to recuse themselves or dismiss their
clerk from working on a particular case.42
In light of these developments, some scholars have deemed clerking
an "institution" 43 and the clerk's role in the judiciary as part of a
Supreme Court clerks are "guaranteed near-reverence," "a fat salary," as well as "power and
influence," and that "[lI]egal academia is dominated by former clerks," and "big law firms" "col-
lect them like trophies"). Indeed, a clerk may dream that their clerkship will eventually lead
them back to the Supreme Court as a Justice as it did for Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
(clerk for Justice Robert H. Jackson October Term 1952), Justice John Paul Stevens (clerk for
Justice Wiley B. Rutledge October Term 1947), Justice Byron R. White (clerk for Justice Fred M.
Vinson October Term 1946), and Justice Stephan Breyer (clerk for Justice Arthur Goldberg
October Term 1964). But see William H. Simon, Judicial Clerkships and Elite Professional Cul-
ture, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129, 130 (1986) (disputing the advantages of clerkships and describing
how elite law school culture leads students to overestimate the clerkship's value).
38. See Wald, supra note 30, at 153 ("The judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and
mutually dependent one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair.").
39. Eugene A. Wright, Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VAND.
L. REV. 1179, 1189 n.38 (1973) (proposing that confidentiality has been "an honored tradition
among law clerks").
40. See, e.g., Oliva v. Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that for the "pur-
poses of absolute judicial immunity, judges and their law clerks are as one"); DeFerro v. Coco,
719 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that a judicial clerk was entitled to absolute immunity
because he acted pursuant to a judge's instructions). See also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Immu-
nity from Civil and Criminal Liability, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1990) (stating that clerks
are entitled to share in judicial immunity because clerks' work is judicial in nature).
41. See Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that a clerk's
continued "participation with the magistrate in a case in which her future employers were coun-
sel gave rise to an appearance of partiality"); Courting Conflict?, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1996, at
2 (criticizing Justice Clarence Thomas for hiring a Senate Judiciary Committee counsel as a clerk
because cases challenging legislation the clerk worked on might have arisen while he clerked at
the Court).
42. See generally PepsiCo, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985) (deciding that acci-
dental contact by clerks with "headhunters" from firms with cases before judge mandated
recusal); Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that the
clerk's visit to the scene of accident and report to judge about his findings mandated recusal);
Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (discovering that a
clerk's acceptance of a job with plaintiff's firm during trial mandated recusal).
43. See CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 158.
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growing cancerous "bureaucracy."'44 Generally, as institutions ex-
pand, it becomes increasingly difficult to control individual mem-
bers.45 With more clerks roaming within judicial chambers, less
personal contact is possible, which can translate into decreased overall
communication between a judge and clerk.46 The absence of ade-
quate communication can ultimately stifle the quality of the work pro-
duced by the relationship. As a result of the increase in caseload,
along with the growth in the number of clerks hired, the role of clerk
has evolved considerably since its inception.
2. The Evolution Of Responsibilities
Today, clerks are bound not only by the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 47 but also by the Code of Judicial Conduct,4 8 and the more strin-
gent Code of Conduct for Law Clerks.49 However, no statutory
provisions have been enacted to guide what functions clerks can and
cannot perform. Within the existing strictures, each judge has reign
over the development of his or her clerk's particular role. Throughout
history, judges have assigned clerks to perform a myriad of func-
tions.50 At times, judges have been accused of going too far in dele-
44. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)
(discussing the problems that may arise when judges rely on law clerks) [hereinafter CRISIS AND
REFORM]; Harry T. Edwards, A Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and the Legal Method, 80
MICH. L. REV. 259 (1981) (rebutting Joseph Vining's arguments infra); Owen M. Fiss, The
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983) (applying Max Weber's and Hannah
Arendt's analyses of bureaucracy to the federal judiciary); Richard B. Hoffman, The Bureau-
cratic Spectre: Newest Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60 (1982) (concluding that since
"we have entrusted judicial tasks to judges-not to law clerks," bureaucratization is "an inappro-
priate course for the courts"); Wade H. McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 777 (1981) (discussing generally the problems that arise with growth in judicial
staff); Gilbert S. Merritt, Owen Fiss on Paradise Lost: The Judicial Bureaucracy in the Adminis-
trative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1469 (1983) (responding to Fiss's article); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Taking Bureaucracy Seriously, 99 HARV. L. REV. 344 (1985) (reviewing CRISIS AND REFORM);
Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Effi-
ciency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648 (1980) (recognizing the increase of institutional judging);
Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248 (1981) (comment-
ing on the need to look closely at the legal method in light of the possible bureaucratization of
the courts); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem With the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Col-
legiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766 (1983) (defending the increased staff as helpful to
the administration of justice).
45. See CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 176.
46. See id. at 177.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995).
48. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
49. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1989).
50. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939-1975, 171-72 (1980).
Holmes ... took a clerk largely as a companion. Brandeis used a clerk as researcher
for the voluminous footnotes often found in his opinions. Stone would dictate his opin-
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1999] A COURT OF CLERKS 629
gating judicial duties.51 Overall, most of the tasks performed by clerks
are not controversial and are universal among chambers.
One of the principal responsibilities of a clerk has been to perform
legal research. Verifying citations included in the parties' briefs can
be a tedious task, but an important one. This research provides judges
with information necessary to make an informed decision.52 This role
has been the subject of some controversy because a clerk's research
can skew a judge's perspective.5 3 However, due to the rise in the
caseload, a judge's time is better spent on other pursuits. Further-
more, Supreme Court clerks participate in a heavily debated practice
known as the "cert pool system. ' 54 More than seven thousand peti-
tions for writs of certiorari arrive at the doorstep of the Supreme
ions, and when he stated a principle of law he would say in parentheses "Cite cases."
The draft would go to the clerk, who would then look for the cases supporting Stone's
position.
Justice Murphy... relied heavily on [a clerk] in preparing the first draft of his opinions
for the Court.
I used my law clerks primarily to certify the accuracy of my opinions as to facts and
precedents .... The law clerk would write a memorandum on each petition for certio-
rari and on each jurisdictional statement, but I went over each case independently of
him .... [A]t times I asked him to draft a concurring or dissenting opinion for me,
which I in turn would revise or rewrite.
Id.
51. See Dixon v. City of Lawton, Okla., 898 F.2d 1443, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that a
law clerk settled the jury instructions and that this was an improper function for the clerk);
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1988) (deciding that having a law
clerk preside over a hearing gave rise to the appearance of impropriety); United States v. Sloan,
811 F.2d 1359, 1361 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (remarking that having a law clerk settle the instructions
in a criminal case was improper, although parties did not raise the issue); Starshock, Inc. v.
Shusted, 370 F. Supp. 506, 507-08 (D.N.J. 1974) (commenting that the tasks of fact finding and
reporting to judges about allegedly obscene nude dancing are "a far cry from the routine duties
of a judicial law clerk").
52. See Hon. Jerry A. Brown, John Minor Wisdom: Reminiscences of an "Old" Law Clerk, 69
TUL. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (1995).
53. See Swann, supra note 16, at 160 (writing that clerks "research questions of law" and that
"justices often rely on their clerks' summaries and recommendations").
54. The cert pool was created in 1972 "when Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Byron
White, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William H. Rehnquist pooled the efforts of their
clerks." Michael F. Sturley, Cert Pool, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 133 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). The 1980s and 1990s brought Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas,
Steven Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Court and the cert pool. See id.; Tony Mauro,
Ginsburg Plunges into the Cert Pool, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 8. Justice John Paul Stevens
has consistently refused to take the plunge into the cert pool. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 31.
The practice has been controversial because clerks hold the power to decide whether a case is
"certworthy." Id. Essentially, clerks choose which cases the Court will potentially hear. See
Kenneth W. Starr, Rule of Law: Supreme Court Needs a Management Revolt, WALL ST. J., Oct.
13, 1993, at A23; Kenneth W. Starr, Rule of Law: Trivial Pursuits at the Supreme Court, WALL
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Court each term.55 Clerks sift through these thousands of petitions to
identify the small number of cases which are considered
"certworthy. ' 56 The participating Supreme Court clerks then write
"pool memos" for the participating Justices. 57 These memos usually
include a brief summary of the case, a selective statement of the facts,
the lower court disposition, an analysis of the information, and a rec-
ommended disposition. Due to the vast number of cert petitions, the
Justices generally rely solely upon the clerk's memo when making
their decision as to whether to grant cert.
Supreme Court clerks also write opinions.58 The opinion-writing
process is complex.59 Chief Justice William Rehnquist has openly de-
scribed the opinion-writing procedures he has delineated for his
ST. J., Oct. 6, 1993, at A17. Opinion-writing, coming later in the judicial process, and the focus of
this Comment, is similarly controversial because of the potential influence clerks may hold.
55. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 31 (estimating "more than 6,000 petitions"); Marquand,
supra note 8, at 1 (counting "7,500 petitions").
56. LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 31.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 271 (writing that during the October Term of 1988, "the vast majority of opinions
the Court issued were drafted exclusively by clerks"); DOMNARSKI, supra note 9, at 30 (stating
that "the law clerks of the Supreme Court Justices are fully institutionalized in the opinion-
writing process"); Louis LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUNES: THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN
AMERICA 156 (1993) (admitting that the Justices "now function ... as managing partners of five-
member law firms" and "often delegate to law clerks the task of drafting full opinions"); RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 148 (1990) ("[M]ost judicial opinions are
written by the judges' law clerks rather than by the judges themselves."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
SUPER CHIEF EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 340-413
(1984) (revealing that Justice Felix Frankfurter's opinion in Abel v. United States and his dissents
in Baker v. Carr and Elkins v. United States "[were] almost entirely the clerk's work"); Crump,
supra note 11, at 238 (acknowledging that judges commonly delegate to clerks the task of writing
a first draft of an opinion); Laura E. Little, Hiding With Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and
Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 120 (1998) ("Our society frequently in-
dulges the fiction that United States Supreme Court Justices write the opinions that bear their
names."); Mahoney, supra note 37, at 339 (admitting that "[f]aw clerks are often responsible for
a judge's first draft"); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1995) [hereinafter Wald, Judicial Writings]
(arguing for increased disposal of cases without opinions because "[o]nly the parties and their
lawyers read them, and for the most part, law clerks, not judges, draft them"); Wald, supra note
30, at 154 (using clerks to draft opinions is routine); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of
Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1171 (1994) (noting the delegation of opin-
ion-writing to clerks due to increased demands on judges); Philip Kurland, Making and Remak-
ing the Law of the Land, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1987, at 3 (writing that clerks enjoy an
extraordinary role in the writing of opinions that become the "law of the land" and that Justice
Louis Brandeis would be "aghast").
59. Clerks have dense information at their disposal in preparing to draft an opinion, including
transcripts and lower court opinions. However, clerks have been warned by some courts not to
wander outside certain parameters in gathering information. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996,
1011 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that clerk's ex parte request for information from counsel should
not have been made); Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 1981)
(finding off-the-record view of plaintiff's plant by clerks was presumptively prejudicial but ulti-
1999] A COURT OF CLERKS 631
clerks. At conference, a Justice is assigned to write the majority opin-
ion.60 Since clerks are barred from attending this conference, the
Chief Justice speaks with his clerks afterward about the discussion and
decision made at the conference. 61 Justice Rehnquist provides his
clerks with a summary of the conference discussion, a description of
the result reached by the majority, and his or her views on how to
write the opinion. 62 His clerks are then required to prepare a first
draft within the next ten days.63 Typically, Justice Rehnquist, similar
to the other Justices, edits and revises his clerks' work product.64
Although Justice Rehnquist revises the clerks' drafts, he admits that
the "practice of assigning the task of preparing first drafts of Court
opinions to law clerks who are usually just one or two years out of law
school may undoubtedly and with some reason cause raised eyebrows
in the legal profession and outside of it."'65 The Chief Justice, how-
ever, assures that his clerks are not set loose to "frolic" on their own.66
When Justice Rehnquist is satisfied with the opinion, it is circulated to
the other Justices for review.67 After reviewing the opinion, the Jus-
tices and their clerks suggest changes, agree with the opinion, or de-
mately overcome); Kennedy v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 596-98 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding that testimony at trial by clerk regarding visit to site was prejudicial).
60. The Justices meet twice a week to deliberate on cases currently before the Court. See
Robert J. Janosik, The Conference, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNrrED STATES 174-75 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). The Chief Justice initiates the discussion
and it proceeds in order of seniority. Id. If four Justices agree to grant review, the case is
scheduled for briefing and oral argument. Id. No formal records are typically kept of the con-
ferences because of the need for secrecy. Id. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST: THE SUPREME
COURT, How IT WAS, How IT Is 295 (1987) (conveying his view that the purpose of conference
"is not to persuade one's colleagues through impassioned advocacy to alter their views, but in-
stead by hearing each justice express his own views to determine therefrom the view of the
majority of the Court").
61. No clerks, secretaries, or visitors are permitted behind the closed doors once a conference
has started. See Janosik, supra note 60, at 174; see also Edward P. Lazarus, The Case of the
Severed Arm: A Tribute to Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 725, 727
(1994) (recalling that Justice Blackmun would "summarize the remarks of each of the justices").
62. See REHNQUIST, supra note 60, at 298.
63. See id. Edward Lazarus, former clerk to Justice Blackmun, described how Justice Rehn-
quist placed a "premium on efficiency." LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 285. Justice Stevens has
reportedly complained to Justice Rehnquist that his assembly-line approach to opinion-writing
was having an "'adverse effect on quality."' Id. at 286.
64. See REHNQUIST, supra note 60, at 298-99. This judicial breed, the so-called "Editor-
Judge," has been criticized as one that transforms a judge from a craftsman into an editor. See
infra note 303. There are some judges who do not assign this task to their clerks, but these
judges are becoming rarer with time.
65. REHNQUIST, supra note 60, at 299.
66. See id. at 300.
67. See id. at 301-02.
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cline to join the opinion.68 Essentially, clerks have evolved from
secretaries to opinion-writers.
B. The Relationship Models
Given the diversity of judges, each judge-clerk relationship carries
unique expectations; nonetheless, the varying work styles of clerks
have formed certain patterns. Some aspects of these clerkship models
are molded from the true tasks clerks have undertaken, while others
have grown up around myth. Mystery has surrounded the judiciary
due to the secrecy clouding the third branch of government.69 Given
the mystique, myths are, at times, the only source of information one
can gather about the Supreme Court. The image of the judiciary has
become a great concern. Even published case law has demonstrated
68. See id. at 302-03.
69. The introduction to The Brethren speaks of the secrecy surrounding the Court as justifica-
tion for publication of the ground-breaking book.
For those nearly two hundred years, the Court has made its decisions in absolute se-
crecy, handing down its judgments in formal written opinions. Only these opinions,
final and unreviewable, are published. No American institution has so completely con-
trolled the way it is viewed by the public. The Court's deliberative process-its internal
debates, the tentative positions taken by the Justices, the preliminary votes, the various
drafts of written opinions, the negotiations, confrontations, and compromises-is hidden
from public view.
The Court has developed certain traditions and rules, largely unwritten, that are
designed to preserve the secrecy of its deliberations. The few previous attempts to
describe the Court's internal workings-biographies of particular Justices and histories
of individual cases-have been published years, often decades, after the events, or have
reflected the viewpoints of only a few Justices.
BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 1
(1979). Another commentator expressed the hidden identity of the Justices as follows:
Each justice is a powerful figure, with the ability to cast one of nine votes in decisions
that have considerable impact on the lives of Americans. Yet the justices are hardly
famous. In a 1989 survey, people were asked the names of the associate justices; 23
percent mentioned Sandra Day O'Connor, and Anthony Kennedy ranked second at 7
percent. Nine percent of the respondents remembered that William Rehnquist was
chief justice; by comparison, 54 percent recalled that the judge of "The People's
Court," a television program, was Joseph Wapner.
BAUM, supra note 34, at 17-18.
Of course, the recent phenomenon of new "judge" shows (Judge Judy, Judge Mills Lane, etc.)
invading the television docket may spark the public's interest in the court system. Great public
interest has also been demonstrated for channels such as C-SPAN and COURT TV. The nomi-
nation battles over Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas contributed to the increase of public
attention to the Supreme Court. For a glimpse into the blossoming debate about whether the
Supreme Court should be more open to public scrutiny, see Todd Piccus, Note, Demystifying the
Least Understood Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to Broadcast Media, 71 TEX. L. REv.
1053, 1067-97 (1993); Joan Biskupic, Marketer of Court Tapes Risks Supreme Censure: Oral Ar-
guments of Famous Cases Were Reproduced Despite Agreement With National Archives, WASH.
POST, Aug. 30, 1993, at A6; Eleanor Randolph, Justices Continue Ban on Courtroom Cameras:
Video's Trial Run Proves Unpersuasive, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1989, at A23.
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that the "appearance" of the courts is key to the legitimacy of the
judiciary.70 Therefore, both the reality and the myths of how clerks
operate are important to our understanding of the role clerks have
undertaken, and to the formation of the relationship models.
1. The Clerkship Ideal: The Sounding Board Model
Under the "sounding board" model, the judicial clerk brings the ad-
versarial process into the chambers, thereby forcing the judge to jus-
tify each step of reasoning.71 The clerk functions as a legal innovator,
introducing new ideas and perspectives, but not chipping away at the
judge's decision-making power. In essence, the clerk is a sounding
board. His or her goal is to help sharpen the judge's view of a case.72
A judge asserts a proposition and invites the clerk to intellectually
attack it to test potential strengths and weaknesses. A clerk is unin-
hibited in participating in rigorous debate with the judge. 73 The quin-
tessential sounding board scenario is demonstrated by Judge Learned
Hand's relationship with his clerks.
70. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 48, at Canon 2 ("A judge shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety of the judge's in all activities.") (emphasis ad-
ded); see also In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 47 F.3d 399, 400 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing
Canon 2); Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (referring to the "appear-
ance of partiality"); In re Dean, 717 A.2d 176, 184 (Conn. 1998) ("Avoiding the appearance of
impropriety is as important to developing public confidence in the judiciary as avoiding impro-
priety itself"); Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1235 n.9 (Conn. 1998)
(citing Canon 2); In re Green Rivers Forest, Inc., 190 B.R. 477, 482 (Bankr. M.S. Ga. 1995)
(same); In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 708 (Ind. 1998) (same); In re Harris, 713 So.2d 1138, 1141
(La. 1998) (same); In re Ferrara, 582 N.W.2d. 817, 820 (Mich. 1998) (cautioning judges to avoid
the "appearance of bias"); Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Spencer, 725 So. 2d
171, 176-77 (Miss. 1998) (citing Canon 2); Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v.
Thomas, 722 So. 2d 629, 630 (Miss. 1998) (same); In re Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d 307, 315 (Wis. 1998)
(stating that judges must "[avoid] the appearance that the process might be unfair").
71. See OAKLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 37; George D. Braden, The Value of Law
Clerks, 24 Miss. L.J. 295, 296 (1953) ("Discussion of a case serves to clarify a man's thoughts,
and a clerk can be of great value to a judge by asking pointed questions, posing alternatives, and
generally acting as a devil's advocate.").
72. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 289-91 (1994). Part
of Gunther's knowledge of Judge Hand stems from his clerkship for Judge Hand before going on
to clerk for Chief Justice Earl Warren at the Supreme Court.
73. See James L. Volling, Warren E. Burger: An Independent Pragmatist Remembered, 22 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 39, 58 (1996) (reminiscing about how Chief Justice Burger often used his
clerks as sounding boards). See also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 65 (explain-
ing that Justice White would press his clerks to clarify their own, as well as his, arguments);
Kevin J. Worthen, Shirt-Tales: Clerking for Byron White, 1994 BYU L. REV. 349, 350 (remem-
bering how Justice White would use clerks as sounding boards so he could "fully consider all
possible arguments and points of view").
634 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:621
a. Judge Hand: The Father of the Sounding Board
In 1924, Judge Hand was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 74 He eagerly hired a clerk to serve at
his side. 75 Judge Hand has been described by a former clerk as having
"a deep-rooted open-mindedness and skepticism about his work...
[with] a genuine capacity for listening and indeed a deep-seated desire
for points of view different than his own."' 76 Judge Hand often jok-
ingly referred to his clerks as "puny judges. ' 77 He preferred face-to-
face contact with his clerks, unlike most other judges at the time who
preferred communication through their clerks' written work.78 Judge
Hand's clerks were expected to familiarize themselves with the cases
pending before the court and to discuss them candidly with him. 79 He
primarily used his clerks to sharpen his view on a case. 80 Judge Hand
would press a passive clerk and insist on continuous oral debate.81
The clerkship model developed by Judge Hand has endured and has
been codified in published opinions.
b. Fredonia: The Sounding Board Codified
In 1978, the sounding board model was codified in case law in
Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp.82 The Fredonia case in-
volved a breach of contract for the sale of broadcasting equipment.83
The principle issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly de-
nied RCA's motion to disqualify either Fredonia's counsel or the pre-
siding judge. 84 RCA wanted Fredonia's counsel disqualified because
74. See GUNTHER, supra note 72, at 288-89.
75. See id. at 288. When Judge Hand became a district judge in 1909, he used money allocated
for a stenographer to hire a clerk. Id. These clerks performed secretarial tasks and legal re-
search. Id. Judge Hand eventually abandoned the practice until he was elevated to the Second
Circuit. Id.
76. Gerald Gunther, Reflections on Judicial Administration in the Second Circuit, From the
Perspective of Learned Hand's Days, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 505, 510 (1994).
77. GUNTHER, supra note 72, at 141.
78. See id. at 289.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 289-90. Hand's working procedure with his clerks was as follows:
In every case Hand considered at all unclear-and he was uncertain about the proper
result in most cases, even after decades of judicial experience-he would spend many
hours with his clerk at every stage of the decisional process, before and while writing
his pre-conference memoranda, before and while writing his formal opinions, repeat-
edly asking for the clerk's criticisms and responses.
Id.
81. See id. at 290-91.
82. 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978).
83. See id. at 253.
84. See id. at 254.
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he had formerly been a clerk to the trial judge.8 5 RCA argued that
Fredonia's counsel had an intimate knowledge of the case because he
had served as clerk when the case first came before the judge. 86
Therefore, he knew the judge's intimate inclinations on the issues. 87
In resolving the issue, the Fredonia court openly discussed the role of
law clerks in the judicial process.
The court's opinion noted that clerks perform a variety of functions
in assisting a judge.8 8 According to the court, these duties include
clerical and administrative chores, research, and drafting memoranda
and opinions. 89 The court accepted the clerk's role as critical to the
judge's work.90 The court reasoned that barring former clerks from
future practice before their employer-judge would be impractical. 91
However, the court decided that "justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice. ' 92 Due to the nature of the judge-clerk relationship, the
trial judge invited some serious questions regarding his impartiality
when he refused to recuse himself.93 Decades after Judge Hand's in-
novative relationship with his clerks, the Fredonia opinion codified the
sounding board function by stating in a published opinion that "clerks
may serve as sounding boards for ideas, often affording a different
perspective .... ,,94
2. The Clerk-As-Mirror Model
The best clerks I knew were those who took a Justice's basic philos-
ophy and tried to work within that framework. The least effective
course would be to attempt continually to convince a Justice to take
positions that, given his personal philosophy and past decisions,
were simply inconceivable .... [A clerk should] synchronize one's
own patterns of thought and expression with those of the Justice, in
short, to move on his wavelength. 95
Under this second model, the "mirror model," a clerk becomes a
mirror of the judge's views and predilections. The clerk does not af-
firmatively challenge the judge, as he would under the sounding board
model. Rather, the clerk anticipates and mimics the judge's positions.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Fredonia, 569 F.2d at 255.
89. See id. at 255-56.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 256.
92. See id. (quoting Offult v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
93. See id.
94. Fredonia, 569 F.2d at 256.
95. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 61-62.
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The clerk refrains from championing a personal cause through
manipulating his or her tasks as a research assistant and confidant.96
Submerging his or her ideological beliefs, the clerk defers to the rea-
soning of the judge.
The "mirror model" closely parallels the pattern that judges create
in their selection of clerks. The majority of judges hire clerks who
mirror their own experience and ideals. Judges search for students
who have attended their alma mater and who have participated in
similar activities, such as the law review.97 Due to the closeness of the
judge-clerk relationship and the writing responsibilities abdicated to
the clerk, judges adhering to this model choose individuals with simi-
lar backgrounds, values, and viewpoints. Judges seek these individu-
als in hopes they will serve as a mirror, reflecting the judge's thinking
and goals.98
3. The Clerk-As-Judge Model
Judge Hand's phrase "puny judge" more accurately reflects the
characteristics of this model. The "puny judge" model is the most ex-
treme because it contemplates an inexperienced clerk bestowed with
the awesome power of a judge. 99 The clerk operating under this
model is intent on influencing the judge's decision-making and opin-
96. See Saul Brenner, The memos of Supreme Court law clerk William Rehnquist: conservative
tracts, or Mirrors of his justice's mind?, 76 JUDICATURE 77, 77 (1992). This is the model pro-
posed by our current Chief Justice William Rehnquist, one which, Brenner concludes, Justice
Rehnquist followed fairly closely when he clerked for Justice Robert Jackson. Id.
97. One scholar wrote, "[s]ome justices have expected their clerks to agree with them philo-
sophically and to share their habits. Justice James C. McReynolds frequently insisted that his
clerks be single and not smoke or chew tobacco." Swann, supra note 16, at 160.
98. See Simon, supra note 37, at 135 ("[T]he job is not just research, writing, and consulting, it
is turning yourself into the kind of person the judge likes to have working for her.").
99. Judge Posner echoed this possibility when he wrote:
The judges can have assistants who are not themselves judges, but cannot just hand
over their authority to those assistants. If they do, the assistants become judges-judges
whose conditions of employment violate Article III. A district judge cannot tell his law
clerk, "You try this case-I am busy with other matters-and render judgment, and the
losing party can if he wants appeal to the court of appeals." The judge cannot do this
even if the parties consent, and even though the statute authorizing federal district
judges to appoint law clerks (28 U.S.C. § 752) does not specify the duties of law clerks.
In my example the law clerk is acting as a judge, though not called a judge ....
Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
Interestingly, when Richard A. Posner clerked for Justice William J. Brennan during the 1962-
1963 Term, he drafted an opinion ultimately adopted by the court.
[Richard Posner] had been asked to prepare a draft opinion in the case of a defendant
who wanted a hearing on his second post-conviction petition. Fresh from Harvard Law
School, where he had been law review president and valedictorian, and had graduated
magna cum laude, Posner took to the task with relish.
1999] A COURT OF CLERKS
ion-writing powers. Whether clerks influence judges profoundly re-
mains to be studied and proven. Regardless, the perception of clerks
influencing a jurist so profoundly has become rather pervasive. 100
This perception has been portrayed most renownedly in three recent
books about the mysterious Supreme Court. Books, as a populist me-
dium, have placed this image of clerk-as-judge into the mainstream.10'
a. Lighting a Candle in the Darkness: The Brethren
In 1979, journalists Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong published
the bestseller The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court ("The Breth-
ren").02 The book detailed events that occurred inside the Supreme
Court from 1969 to 1976.103 Within the pages, the authors scurried
through such important topics of the Court's jurisprudence as the ex-
clusionary rule, obscenity, abortion, the death penalty, the Watergate
tapes, and the Pentagon Papers. To form the narrative, the authors
amalgamated interviews with over 200 people, including approxi-
mately 170 former law clerks, as well as Justices and other Court em-
ployees. 10 4 The Brethren's journalistic style appealed beyond the legal
profession to the general reading public.
Brennan liked the draft, but there was a problem: In conference, the justices had
voted to deny a new hearing; Posner's draft granted it. "It was a complete misunder-
standing on my part," Posner has since recalled. Still, he says, Brennan was both
amused at the situation and impressed with his clerk's reasoning. "I'll see if I can sell
it," he told Posner. And so it was that in the case of Sanders v. U.S., 373 U.S. 1, the
Supreme Court was reversed by a 23-yer-old clerk and did grant the hearing.
Alexander Wohl, Paper Trailblazer, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 68, 68 (emphasis added).
100. For example, two op-ed columnists charged Justice Anthony Kennedy with being influ-
enced to take liberal positions on cases by a clerk who was a former student of Laurence Tribe.
Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Justice Kennedy's Flip, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1992, at A25.
101. For two other prominent books that have thrust the role of the Supreme Court and its
clerks into the limelight, see PETER IRONS & STEPHANIE GUrTON, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
TRANSCRIPTS OF 23 LIVE RECORDINGS OF LANDMARK CASES As ARGUED BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT (1993); WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 10-68.
102. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 2. For criticisms of The Brethren, see
Burke Marshall, The Brethren, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 149 (1980); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Eaves-
dropping on Justice, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 11 (1981); see also Allan Ashman, The Court's latest por-
trait: overexposed, underdeveloped, 63 JUDICATURE 346 (1980); William J. Daniels, The Clerks
Talk: Commentary and Analysis of The Brethren, 44 ALBANY L. REV. 732 (1980); John P. Frank,
The Supreme Court: The Muckrakers Return, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1980, at 160; Philip B. Kurland,
"The Brethren": A Hyped-Up Stunt for "Political Voyeurs," 85 COM. L.J. 93 (1980); Anthony
Lewis, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court-A Review, 52 N.Y. ST. B. J. 205 (1980); Floyd
Abrams, Trivializing the Supreme Court, FORTUNE, Mar. 10, 1980, at 129.
103. The Brethren reached number one on the New York Times Best Seller list shortly after its
publication. See Best Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1979, § 7, at 20. It occupied the number one
position for a total of nine weeks. See JOHN BEAR, THE #1 NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER 158
(1992).
104. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 3-4.
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The Brethren overflows with tales of clerks influencing the Supreme
Court Justices. An example from the book illustrates this point. In
the case of O'Connor v. Donaldson,10 5 Woodward and Armstrong set
the scene with Justice Stewart (the cat) away for a day leaving his
clerks (the mice) to play.10 6 Clerks from other chambers, sans Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist's clerks, trickled into Justice
Stewart's chambers to discuss the case. 10 7 The clerks feared Chief Jus-
tice Burger was "trying to screw the mentally ill" with his "fascist"
opinion. 0 8 The clerks decided to mobilize to ensure no other Justice
would sign onto the Chief Justice's draft.'0 9 The clerks also decided
Justice Stewart should write a dissent to turn around the votes and
create a new majority." 0 Justice Stewart's clerks agreed to present a
strong case to influence their boss to undertake this action; the clerks
appealed to Justice Stewart to influence their boss to use his power to
command a majority."' Justice Stewart agreed to write a short and
narrow dissent.1 2 Eventually, enough of the remaining eight Justices
joined Justice Stewart's dissent to turn it into a majority.113 In this
vignette from The Brethren, the clerks appear to be orchestrating not
only the writing of opinions, but also the decision-making. Certainly,
the book has helped to mold the modern image of judicial clerks. Fur-
thermore, the book inspired other authors to tell stories of clerks un-
dertaking a judge's responsibilities.
b. Raising the Curtain: Closed Chambers
Edward Lazarus clerked for Justice Harry A. Blackmun during the
1988 Term.1 4 In 1998, Lazarus published Closed Chambers: The First
Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court
("Closed Chambers"), expounding on his insider view of the Supreme
Court. Like the authors of The Brethren, Lazarus interviewed other
former clerks, reviewed the Justices' private papers at the Library of
Congress, and reflected on other scholarly studies to round out his
experiences.1 5 Lazarus witnessed, and wrote at length about, the
105. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
106. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 374-76.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 374-76.
113. See id. at 380.
114. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 119.
115. See id. at xi-xii. Lazarus notes his reliance on Justice Thurgood Marshall's private papers,
held at the Library of Congress. Id. Justice Marshall's papers, which include 173,700 documents,
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great power conferred on clerks by the Supreme Court Justices. 116 In
fact, this was one of Lazarus' main claims in his book. Lazarus con-
veyed this theme most clearly when he wrote that the Justices "yield
great and excessive power to immature, ideologically driven clerks,
who in turn use that power to manipulate their bosses and the institu-
tion they ostensibly serve." 117
Lazarus asserted that the clerks perform important functions in-
cluding drafting majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions. 118 He
also observed that debate among the Justices during voting confer-
ences was nonexistent. 1 9 He claimed that Chief Justice Rehnquist sti-
fled exchange by repeatedly declaring that the details would "come
out in the writing.' 20 Key words and phrases were chosen by clerks,
and first drafts enjoyed great deference.' 2' For clerks, every opinion
was an opportunity to make an impression on the law.' 22 Lazarus
concluded that the Justices had not drawn a clear line of propriety for
the clerks in carrying out their important responsibilities.12 3
As an example of clerk impropriety, Lazarus described the proceed-
ings in the case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.124 Lazarus
writes about a clerk who had made it his personal mission to prevent
Justice Kennedy from joining Justice Brennan's draft opinion. 2 5 The
clerk cunningly developed a three-pronged strategy. One, appeal to
Justice Kennedy's conservative instincts regarding the limited judicial
role.1 2 6 Two, instill a distrust of Justice Brennan among the conserva-
tives.' 27 Three, present Justice Kennedy with a draft dissent to sign
were made available just two years after he departed from the Court. See Neil A. Lewis, Rare
Glimpses of Judicial Chess and Poker, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at Al. The release of a Jus-
tice's private papers to the general public so soon after retirement is rare in modern Supreme
Court history. Id. There was concern about the early release because his colleagues were still on
the Court and the issues touched upon were still hotly debated. See Daniel Klaidman, Gold
Mine or Land Mine? Marshall Papers Could Alter High-Court Litigation Strategy, LEGAL TIMES,
May 31, 1993, at 1 (discovering that attorneys could examine Justice Marshall's files for internal
memoranda revealing individual Justice's thoughts on issues to help determine what will happen
in their case).
116. Lazarus disclosed some specific instances of overreaching by clerks and over-delegation
by the Justices. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 262-87, 314-15, 321-22, 384.
117. Id. at 6.
118. See id. at 29.
119. See id. at 285.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 272-73.
122. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 271.
123. See id. at 271-72.
124. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
125. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 314-16.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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onto.128 This tale of a careful clerk's planning to attempt to alter judi-
cial decision-making is another example of the perception created of a
clerk trying to act as a judge.
c. Is Art Imitating Life?: The Tenth Justice
Even popular novelists have turned to entertaining the public with
stories 129 centered on the role of clerks at the Supreme Court. In
1997, Brad Meltzer's novel The Tenth Justice became a New York
Times Bestseller. 130 The bulk of the plot concerns an outsider's
schemes to personally profit by learning the outcome of certain
Supreme Court decisions before they are announced. 131 The intrigue
emerges from the outsider's manipulation of a clerk to accomplish his
financial goals. Intertwined with the main storyline are significant
windows into the role of clerks at the Court. 32 In many areas, Melt-
zer's book mirrors the reality of a clerkship. These similarities include
how the cert pool is conducted, 33 how death penalty stay applications
are reviewed, 34 what methods clerks employ to write opinions, 35
how the "clerk family" is made up of "conservative" and "liberal" fac-
128. See id.
129. For other recent popular novels whetting the public's appetite for Supreme Court in-
trigue, see JOHN GRISHAM, THE PELICAN BRIEF (1992); STANLEY POTrTINGER, THE FOURTH
PROCEDURE (1995); MARGARET TRUMAN, MURDER IN THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
130. MELTZER, supra note 4. See James Barron, Presumed Best Seller: Law Student Wins Top
Money for First Novel, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1996, at 21 (quoting Meltzer as stating, "[y]ou
wouldn't believe how many people in that law school are working on novels and screenplays").
131. For those who scoff at this genre of literature, take note that this scenario is not so far
fetched because it has been hypothesized before, in a more respected medium-case law.
A law clerk knows for the most part what his judge knows: how motions will be de-
cided, what findings will be entered, and how much in damages will be awarded. They
know these things well before the litigants do, and more to the point, before the stock
market closes .... It does not take a wealth of imagination to appreciate that a corrupt
law clerk could retire young.
Bishop v. Albertson's, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (citations omitted) (empha-
sis added).
132. Art imitates life in many aspects of Meltzer's novel. The clerks for the make-believe
October Term graduated from Stanford, Harvard, and Yale Law Schools. MELTZER, supra note
4, at 2-3. Compare WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 237 (revealing that a clerk of
Justice Powell who had spoken with a reporter for the New York Times offered to resign, but
Justice Powell allowed him to remain), with MELTZER, supra note 4, at 50-51 (writing that after
the clerk's indiscretions were revealed he had to resign from his position).
133. See MELTZER, supra note 4, at 14-15.
134. See id. at 25-38.
135. See id. at 105. The two clerks in the novel had developed "an efficient method for writing
opinions." Id. Ben composed the first draft because of his talent of "crafting original argu-
ments." Id. Lisa edited his drafts because she could "see the holes in the most well-reasoned
arguments" and was a "stickler for detail." Id. When this process was completed, they would
send the opinion to their Justice for consideration. Id.
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tions,136 how big firms woo clerks, 137 and the sometimes coarse rela-
tionship between the Justices. 138
There are many snippets in The Tenth Justice that give the impres-
sion of clerks acting as judges. First, the opening speech to the incom-
ing Supreme Court clerks declared that the clerks were "the tenth
justice" because "[clerks] will draft decisions that change lives" and
"the justices will rely entirely on your analysis."'1 39 Second, later in
the story one clerk commented that "the older clerks would teach the
younger clerks how to sway decisions to their own agenda.' 140 The
clerk went on to say that "[w]hen you write a decision, for the most
part you can structure it your own way. You can emphasize certain
points, or make other points extra ambiguous. It's a subtle gesture of
power, but it's still power.' 141 Finally, one clerk declared that he had
"written over thirty decisions since the session began."'142 These three
parts of Meltzer's novel demonstrate the model of clerks acting as
judges, especially in their opinion-writing capacity.
C. The Importance Of Writing
1. Historical Evidence Of Clerk's Opinion-Writing
An examination of a number of major cases drafted by clerks pro-
vides a deeper perspective on the prevalence and importance of clerk
opinion-writing. These cases have either admittedly been written by
clerks or have been rumored to have been written by clerks. For ex-
ample, footnote four to Justice Harlan Stone's majority opinion in
United States v. Carolene Products Co.143 is the most famous footnote
in the universe of constitutional law.144 During the 1937 Term, Louis
136. Id. at 125. Similar to Lazarus' book, Meltzer touches on the "liberal"/"conservative"
divide among the clerks. Both Meltzer and Lazarus describe the "conservative" clerks as obnox-
ious and deem them the "Cabal." See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 251-287; MELTZER, supra note
4, at 125-26.
137. MELTZER, supra note 4, at 125-27.
138. See id. at 259. "[S]ome of these Justices are almost seventy years old and they still be-
have like children. They're like little kids in a sandbox." Id.
139. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
140. MELTZER, supra note 4, at 126.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 184.
143. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Carolene Products upheld a federal law barring the inter-
state shipment of filled milk. Id. at 154. The Court declared filled milk to be "an adulterated
article of food, injurious to the public health." Id. at 146 (quoting Filled Milk Act of 1923, 21
U.S.C. §§ 61-63). Justice Stone's majority opinion held that the federal law was within the scope
of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 154.
144. See Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote And The Preferred Position of Individ-
ual Rights: Louis Lusky And John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277,
277 (1995). See also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 478-79 (13th ed. 1997).
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Lusky was a law clerk to Justice Stone.145 Lusky has repeatedly ad-
mitted that he wrote the first draft of the now famous footnote. 146
According to Lusky, Justice Stone revised his work, but retained the
majority of Lusky's original words. 147
Reportedly, a clerk of Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,148 an important Fourth Amendment deci-
sion involving the nature of consent to searches.149 The opinion noted
that the privacy of an individual may be lawfully invaded by virtue of
consent obtained by a third party.'50 In The Brethren, the authors re-
vealed that this opinion was written by a clerk. Along with this reve-
lation about the author of Schneckloth, the authors told the following
anecdote about Justice Stewart's work habits: "Stewart wasn't work-
ing too hard ... he and Marshall passed each other in the corridor
most days just before noon-Stewart on his way to work, Marshall on
his way home.'' a15 Thus, the narrative behind Schneckloth includes
the image of not only a clerk writing an opinion, but also the image of
Justice Stewart not "working too hard."
2. Opinion-Writing Issues Discussed In Case Law
a. Professor as Clerk?
Some courts have grappled with the issues surrounding the role of
judge as opinion-writer. In July of 1998, a circuit judge for Milwaukee
145. Linzer, supra note 144, at 278. See LUSKY, supra note 58, at 119-32; Louis LuSKY, By
WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITU-
TION 108-14 (1975); Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982).
146. See Linzer, supra note 144, at 281.
147. See id. at 282. The author acknowledged that Justice Stone circulated his draft opinion
and that other Justices suggested changes. Id. This process happens with most opinions. Some
have argued that the opinion-writing process is safeguarded because other Justices would not
join an opinion if a law clerk seriously deviated from an acceptable expression of the facts and
law. As argued later in this Comment, the first draft gives the writer great power, and more
often than not, the bulk of the original text remains intact, without substantive changes. See
infra text accompanying note 241.
Footnote four reads as follows:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious ... or racial minorities ... whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted).
148. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
149. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 320.
150. See id.
151. Id.
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county was charged with judicial misconduct. 152 The trouble devel-
oped when the clerk's work began to disappoint the judge. 153 A
friend of the judge, a law professor at the Loyola University Law
School in Chicago, began preparing her opinions. 154 This arrange-
ment continued for approximately three years. 55 The professor had
drafted about thirty-two opinions during this time. 56 The court de-
cided that the appearance of fairness had been undermined by this
practice. 57 Damage was inflicted upon the court system, upon the
litigants in the case, and upon the public perception of the fairness of
the judicial system as a whole. 158 The court disciplined the judge be-
cause the professor was unconnected with the judicial system.159 The
court reasoned that if a clerk had written the opinions, no disciplinary
action would be necessary. 16° In essence, the clerk is part of the judi-
cial system.' 61
The dissent voiced frustration at the lack of clear rules for clerks,
just as Edward Lazarus did in his book. 162 According to the dissent,
the lack of guidelines for how to handle clerks and their duties leaves
judges adrift as to where lines ought to be drawn.163 The dissent pro-
posed that the rule forbidding judges to consult with others in fulfil-
ling their decision-making responsibility should not be read
literally.' 64 To do so would forbid the use of law clerks, whose role
had become an accepted part of judicial operations. 165
A 1978 New York case wrestled with similar concerns. 166 The Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York had been
consulting extensively with a number of law professors regarding
pending cases.167 The judge inquired about new developments in the
law and sent the professors the litigants' briefs, requesting preparation
of bench memoranda and first drafts of opinions. 168 The court con-
152. In re Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d 307 (Wis. 1998).
153. See id. at 310.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 315.
158. See Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d at 318.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. (Bablitch, J., dissenting). See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
163. See Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d at 318 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 318-19.
165. See id. at 319.
166. See In re Fuschberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1978).
167. See id. at 646.
168. See id.
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cluded that consulting with a disinterested expert on the law was an
acceptable practice but had conditions. 169 The parties must be noti-
fied as to the identity of the expert and the substance of the judge's
consultation with him or her.170 This would give both parties an op-
portunity to respond to the judge's choice.' 7'
The court expressed deep concern over the appearance created by
the practice of consulting professors without the consent of the par-
ties.1 72 According to the majority, the public's confidence in the inde-
pendence and integrity of the judiciary was impaired by the judge's
actions. 73 The court admitted that law clerks often contribute sub-
stantially to the preparation of opinions, however, the court drew a
distinction between a law clerk and an outside expert.174 The law
clerk was a court employee, a recognized figure in the judicial institu-
tion.' 75 The court believed that clerks were familiar to the litigants
and fully exposed to the parties and thus did not create the same con-
cern that opinion-writing by a professor did.176
b. A Clerk's Refusal to Write an Opinion
In Sheppard v. Beerman,177 a law clerk brought a §1983 complaint
against a justice of the New York Supreme Court. 78 The judge had
ordered his clerk to draft a decision denying a defendant's motion for
speedy trial.179 The clerk refused to draft the decision because he did
not want to take part in "railroading" the defendant. 80 The clerk also
informed the judge that he had taken extensive notes regarding other
misconduct by the judge.' 8' Following an unpleasant exchange of
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Fuchberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 648-49.
175. See id. at 648.
176. See id.
177. 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1994).
178. See id. at 149. Sheppard's complaint also alleged violation of his free speech rights when
fired from his job. Id. at 151. The circuit court determined that the speech was a matter of
public concern. Id. The circuit court held that since Judge Beerman's motive for dismissal was
in dispute, the district court improperly resolved the issue on a motion to dismiss on the plead-
ings. Id. Sheppard also claimed that Judge Beerman's search of his files violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 152. The circuit court, however, ruled that given the intimate nature of the
judge-clerk relationships, Sheppard had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his files, desk,
cabinets, or other work areas. Id.
179. See id. at 149.
180. See id.
181. See id.
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words, the clerk was fired.182 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of the judge's
motion to dismiss.183 The court recognized that a law clerk's protesta-
tions about a judge's ethical lapses are potentially a matter of public
concern and protected by the First Amendment. 184 Therefore, the
court determined that judges do not hold the unbridled power to fire
their clerks.185
D. Naming Names: Mentioning Clerks In Published Opinions
Clerks have made their way into various readable genres, and with
increasing frequency. Beyond the glory of writing opinions, clerks
have been mentioned in the published opinions themselves. For ex-
ample, in Noto v. United States,186 decided in 1955, Justice Harlan rec-
ognized the possibility of a clerk's assistance in making certain
statistical calculations. He wrote, "[t]he foregoing data comes either
from the record in the present case or from the research of my Law
Clerk.' 87 In 1977, in Lee v. United States, 88 Justice Marshall, in his
dissent, quoted a lower court judge as saying, "I don't know who
drafted [the lower court opinion], but I can tell you if a law clerk of
mine out of law school drafted something like that, I would send him
back for a refresher course."'1 89 Also, in 1977, Justice Stevens men-
tioned a clerk in a footnote in his dissent. In Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. United States,19° Justice Stevens wrote:
one of my law clerks advised me that, given the size of the two-year
sample, there is only about a 5% likelihood that a disparity this
large would be produced by a random selection from the labor pool.
If his [the clerk's] calculation (which was made using the method
described in H. Blalock, Social Statistics 151-173 (1972)) is correct,
it is easy to understand why Hazelwood offered no expert
testimony.191
In 1993, in Conroy v. Aniskoff,1 2 Justice Scalia wrote in his
concurrence:
182. See id. at 151. Sheppard called Beerman "corrupt" and a "son of a bitch." Id. at 150.
Beerman called Sheppard "disturbed" and "disloyal." Id. Sheppard apologized and worked the
remainder of the day. Id. The next day, another court officer informed him he was fired. Id.
183. See Sheppard, 18 F.3d at 153.
184. See id. at 151.
185. See id.
186. 76 S. Ct. 255 (1955) (proceedings on application to Mr. Justice Harlan, as circuit justice).
187. Id. at 258 n.4.
188. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
189. Id. at 38 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court record).
190. 433 U.S. 299, 318 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. 507 U.S. 511 (1993).
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I confess that I have not personally investigated the entire legisla-
tive history-or even that portion of it which relates to the four stat-
utes listed above. The excerpts I have examined and quoted were
unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task. The
other Justices have, in the aggregate, many more law clerks than I,
and it is quite possible that if they all were unleashed upon this en-
terprise they would discover, in the legislative materials dating back
to 1917 or earlier, many faces friendly to the Court's holding.193
Furthermore, in Conroy, the majority opinion, in response to the con-
currence, mentioned Justice Scalia's clerk in a footnote by surmising
that "[h]is 'hapless law clerk,' ... has found a good deal of evidence in
the legislative history .... ",194 Finally, and most recently, in the 1998
case of Calderon v. Thompson,195 the Supreme Court determined that
a lower court could not reverse its denial of a writ of habeas corpus
based on a "mishandled law clerk transition" where "the old and the
new law clerks assigned to the case failed to communicate.' '196
The most blatant recognition of a clerk's role came in a 1986 district
court opinion. The judge openly credited a clerk for work well
done. 197 The judge wrote that the opinion was "prepared by William
G. Sommerville, III, Law Clerk, in which the Court fully concurs.' 98
It is particularly interesting that judges have begun to recognize their
clerks' efforts in published opinions in light of the importance of opin-
ions to the consumers of the written law.
II. ANALYSIS
When "the Judge," as his clerks call him, is assigned a case for an
opinion he dives into reading the record and all briefs. He abso-
lutely masters the facts and the arguments. Then he moves into the
relevant literature-cases, statutes, treatises, and law reviews. The
clerks often read along with him or dig out additional material and
feed it to him .... After a while [Justice] Black will feel that he is
ready to do a first draft of the opinion .... The draft is then turned
over to the clerks, and, with all the confidence of youth, they work it
over. Then the fun begins. The two clerks and [Justice] Black
gather around his large desk and start through the draft, word by
word, line by line .... Often revisions result; sometimes a clerk can
get a word or comma accepted, but the substance and decision are
never anything but [Justice] Black's alone. 199
193. Id. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 518 n.12 (citations omitted).
195. 118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998).
196. Id. at 1497-98 (citation omitted).
197. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Schafner, 651 F. Supp. 776, 778 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
198. Id.
199. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 90-91 (citing Daniel J. Meador, Justice Black and His Law
Clerks, 15 ALA. L. REV. 57, 59-60 (1962)).
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A myriad of issues arise when clerks are delegated the task of opin-
ion-writing. Ideally, a presiding judge should write the first draft of an
opinion. As caseloads have grown, this ideal has arguably become un-
attainable. Through the years, many judges have become attentive
editors as clerks have undertaken more and more of their workload.
As these duties grow, clerks must shoulder some of the responsibility
of being accountable to the consumers of written judicial opinions.
These consumers include practitioners, historians and judicial biogra-
phers, and the general public. Clerks must acknowledge the potential
that as their role evolves from a mere sounding board model to one
undertaking more judge-like responsibilities, the more curious these
outside consumers will become of the secretive judicial institution.
Thus, if clerks are not careful in their role, they could become the
catalysts for opening up these "closed chambers" to the purview of the
world.
In analyzing the great shift of responsibility to clerks and its conse-
quences on maintaining judicial secrecy, four choices present them-
selves for consideration. Consumers of judicial opinions must ask
whether society should: (1) continue the judge-clerk relationship as it
operates today; (2) require judges to wholly reclaim their opinion-
writing duties; (3) insist clerks set limitations upon themselves and
scrutinize their own actions more carefully; or (4) openly acknowledge
the role of clerks so that no one can be accused of impropriety. The
most practical choice is the third, given the rise in caseload. Clerks
must stop, think, and impose limitations upon themselves. In Closed
Chambers, author Edward Lazarus ended his judicial expos6 with the
solemn warning that the remedy to restore and repair the Supreme
Court lies with the Justices. 2°° However, Lazarus' conclusion errs in
also not suggesting that the remedy lies to some degree with the
clerks, especially in the blossoming media age.
Since the consequence of clerks acting as judges may be that judicial
chambers are opened up to stiffing outside scrutiny, jurists should be
mindful that some transformation in the image of clerks needs to be
undertaken. The remainder of this Comment will analyze the
problems of accountability which are associated with allowing clerks
to write opinions,201 why judges have deferred the responsibility of
opinion-writing to clerks,202 why the law's consumers should be con-
200. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 517-18 ("The remedy, the power to restore the character
of the Court and to repair its inner processes, lies only in the souls of the Justices
themselves .... ).
201. See infra notes 206-217 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 218-239 and accompanying text.
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cerned about opinion-writing by clerks,20 3 how clerks should operate
within judicial chambers in the blossoming media age,20 4 and the po-
tential consequences if clerks fail to act.20 5
A. Let The Sunshine In: Accountability Problems
The importance of judicial opinion-writing may be uniquely Ameri-
can. Written opinions have been democratically deemed a "text unto
the people. '20 6 Simply stated, written opinions hold Supreme Court
Justices accountable to our nation. 20 7 When presented in written
form, reasoning is open to be questioned and tested. Beyond account-
ability, writing is also the Supreme Court's power source, as the Court
does not control the army or the purse.20 8
Nonetheless, some commentators have argued that the Justices
should not be expected to write their own opinions. These scholars
contend that because the President and Congress, the co-equal
branches, delegate the writing of speeches and legislation to staff
members, the Supreme Court should be free to delegate this function
as well.20 9 However, in such an argument a simple, yet important, dis-
tinction is overlooked-the need for accountability. The executive and
legislative branches enjoy election by the people. However, the
Supreme Court, the most dangerous branch in this respect, does
203. See infra notes 240-274 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 275-308 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 309-322 and accompanying text.
206. DOMNARSKI, supra note 9, at x (quoting former federal district judge Charles Wyzanski).
207. One commentator noted:
I have not found a better test for the solution to a case than its articulation in writing,
which is thinking at its hardest. A judge... often discovers that his tentative views will
not jell in the writing. He wrestles with the devil more than once to set forth a sound
opinion that will be sufficient unto more than the day.
Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L.
REv. 211, 218 (1957). Some judges are held accountable by the voting public. The Supreme
Court Justices, however, are nominated by an elected President and confirmed by an elected
Senate.
208. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78 that the "judiciary, on the contrary,
has no influence over either sword or purse; no directive either of the strength of the wealth of
the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may be said to have neither FORCE
nor WILL but merely judgment .. " THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
209. See Thomas Grey, Holmes' Language of Judging-Some Philistine Remarks, 70 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 5, 6 (1996) (justifying clerk written opinions by claiming that "judges today generally do
not write their own opinions, any more than Presidents or Senators write their own speeches").
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not.21° More importantly, a clerk is typically an anonymous player in
the judicial system, and thus further insulated from public evaluation.
Over the years, the clerk-author has been accepted as somewhat of
a necessary band-aid for an overworked judiciary. Echoing through-
out the chambers of our courts are the cries and moans of docket
strain.211 To cope with the workload, clerks have undertaken a
greater role. Due to the need for more laborers, few outsiders have
questioned the delegation of responsibility to young clerks. However,
society must take the time to question this transfer of power. We must
ask whether, for the sake of administration, will we concede one of
the modern pillars of the American legal profession-judicial opinion-
writing?
The answer proposed by the Tesmer, Fuschberg, Fredonia, and
Sheppard courts seems to be that opinion-writing by judges must be
subservient to judicial economy. 212 Yet, if judicial economy were soci-
ety's sole concern, we might benefit from allowing law professors to
assist judges in their opinion-writing, as was done in Tesmer and
Fuschberg.21 3 Furthermore, if law professors were allowed to help
judges write opinions, a better quality product may result. On one
side of the scale is a seasoned professor, schooled in the law and how
to envision the bigger legal picture. On the other side is a young
clerk, often without practical life experiences. 21 4 Seemingly, judicial
economy is not society's sole concern.
210. Of course, many state court judgeships are obtained via election. However, the primary
focus of this Comment is on Supreme Court clerks. Nonetheless, lower court clerks should still
consider the suggestions offered in this Comment.
211. "Time does not allow for the same careful, thoughtful analysis and writing to be poured
into all cases." Wald, supra note 58, at 1374. Judge Wald has also stated:
If the clerks' efforts advance that goal and are acceptable to the responsible judge, I do
not see what difference it makes as to whose words are in the opinion. Given the size
of records and the inexorable increase in caseloads, precious few of us can perform
without staff support.
Wald, Judicial Writings, supra note 30, at 154.
212. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cit. 1994); In re Fredonia, 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cit.
1978); In re Fuschberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Jud. Ct. 1978); In re Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d 307 (Wis.
1998).
213. For a story of a law professor who took a position as a law clerk during his sabbatical, see
Joseph P. Bauer, A Judicial Clerkship 24 Years After Graduation: Or, How I Spent My Spring
Sabbatical, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 427 (1992).
214. Lazarus wrote:
The sum total of my legal experience amounted to a one-year clerkship with Judge
William A. Norris on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Los Angeles, seven weeks
as a summer associate with a small Washington, D.C., litigation firm, and a semester
advising federal prison inmates in Danbury, Connecticut, as part of the Yale Law
School clinical program.
LAZARUS, supra note 8, at S. See Marquand, supra note 8, at 1 ("Pound for pound, the 36 legal
eagles, some of whom may never have held a job, arguably have more power than a senior
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However, the Tesmer and Fuschberg opinions did not focus on the
considerations of the experience of clerks and the quality of opinions.
Rather, these courts introduced the insider-outsider distinction to jus-
tify delegation of opinion-writing to clerks. These courts reasoned
that a professor was an outsider and a clerk was an insider in the judi-
cial family. 215 In the final analysis, little difference exists. Neither law
professor nor law clerk should intrude upon the domain of a judge in
drafting an opinion. The image of a judge's independence is tarnished
if anyone other than a judge drafts the opinion. Luckily for judges,
insiders, such as clerks, disguise their participation in opinion-writing
more clandestently than outsiders. By retaining responsibility shifting
within the walls of chambers, the public is less likely to discover and
question the practice of clerk opinion-writing.
The Tesmer opinion raised another important issue. The dissent ad-
mitted a need for clearer boundaries within the judge-clerk relation-
ship and lamented that judges are left adrift as to where the lines are
to be drawn for clerk responsibility.216 A discussion of where to draw
the line will be undertaken later in this Comment. 217 For now, how-
ever, it is important to note that a judge has acknowledged in a pub-
lished opinion the lack of guidance given to clerks. This recognition is
the first step to questioning the practice and making improvements.
B. Are Judges Too Busy To Bother With Opinion-Writing?
As mentioned, some judges and scholars have argued that the
strains of business compel judges to delegate some or all of their du-
ties to their clerks, including the writing of opinions.21 8 The Supreme
congressional staffer."); Crump, supra note 11, at 238 ("A law clerk, all he's done is get good
grades in law school.").
215. The distinction rests on the idea that a clerk is an employee of the court and their loyalty
lies with the judge. See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1015 (11th Cir.
1986) (quoting Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983), and stating that the
"clerk is forbidden to do all that is prohibited to the judge").
216. See In re Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d at 318.
217. See infra notes 275-308 and accompanying text.
218. Objections to the proliferation of clerks have been generally silenced because of the "leg-
end" of the burgeoning caseload. For criticism of the role of clerks, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 346-51 (1993) (arguing that the
growth in law clerks has contributed to the "fractionation of opinions"); William M. Richman &
William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned
Hand Tradition, 81 CORN.ELL L. REV. 273, 288-89 (1996) (arguing that more law clerks have
meant a diminished quality in decision-making and opinion-writing). For scholarship comment-
ing on the burdens caused by the rise in caseload, see Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load
and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search
for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 882-89 (1983) (disputing that the rise in
caseload has meant that the courts operate as a bureaucracy); A. Leo Levin & Michael E. Kunz,
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Court Justices already delegate to clerks case screening, cert pool
function,219 reading of the record, and researching the law. Clerks
delve into the facts and the details of the cases. In the end, the clerks
have an expertise in the pending cases because they have performed
much of the legwork and wrestled with the issues. A Justice may be
forced to defer to his or her clerk again when it comes to opinion-
writing. These thoughts lead to the question: what are the Supreme
Court Justices doing with their time?
Recently, the Supreme Court's "incredibly shrinking" plenary
docket has attracted much attention.220 The Court penned a mere
ninety opinions during the 1995-1996 term.221 In the 1971 term, more
than 170 cases were granted review, and the number of opinions re-
mained in this range throughout the 1970s.222 Throughout the 1980s,
the docket reached around 180 cases per term.2 2 3 The high was in the
1981 and 1983 terms, where the Court rendered approximately 184
decisions.224 Given the drop in the total number of opinions to write,
it seems reasonable to conceive that the Justices would be able to re-
claim some of their authorial responsibilities. However, the opposite
appears to be occurring.
Thinking About Judgeships, 44 Am. U. L. REV. 1627, 1640-42 (1995) (articulating that perhaps
the increase in workload has given rise to the increased role of law clerks and questioning their
future role if caseloads continue to grow).
219. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
220. See David M. O'Brien, The Rehnquist Court's shrinking plenary docket, 81 JUDICATURE
58, 58 (1997). The Supreme Court has almost complete control over its docket through the
mechanism of granting or denying writs of certiorari. Evidence of the decreasing caseload can
be seen as follows:
Terms Total Full Opinions
1973 4,186 140
1978 3,888 130
1983 4,218 151
1988 4,773 133
1990 5,510 112
1991 5,865 107
1992 6,236 107
1993 6,896 84
David 0. Stewart, Quiet Times: The Supreme Court is Reducing Its Workload-But Why?, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1994, at 40, 40-44.
221. See O'Brien, supra note 220, at 58.
222. See id. at 59-60.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 59.
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1. Writing Concurring And Dissenting Opinions
Time constraints certainly have not inhibited the preparation of
concurring and dissenting opinions issued by the Supreme Court.225
In recent history, the Justices have become increasingly divided in
their decisions.226 Individual opinions have become more prized than
institutional opinions. 227 Between the years of 1811-1823, the
Supreme Court decided a total of 457 cases.228 Of these, 437 were
unanimous.22 9 This form of judicial unanimity is rare today. Yet, as
more separate opinions are labored over, more time is spent on opin-
ion-writing. This translates into less time for judges themselves to
work on opinions and enables increased judicial delegation of respon-
sibilities to clerks.230 As discussed later in this Comment, perhaps
clerks should use their role as sounding board to mend these divisions
and create more unanimous decision-making.2 31
225. See CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 142.
226. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLrTcs
284 (3d ed. 1993). The Supreme Court, in its 1997 Term, produced 93 full opinions, 52 concur-
ring opinions, and 64 dissenting opinions. The Supreme Court, 1997 Term: Leading Cases, 112
HARV. L. REV 122, 366 (1998). The 1996 Term produced 86 full opinions, 40 concurring opin-
ions, and 66 dissenting opinions. The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L.
REv. 197, 431 (1997). The 1995 Term produced 79 full opinions, 46 concurring opinions, and 67
dissenting opinions. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term: Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 367
(1996). The 1994 Term produced 86 full opinions, 50 concurring opinions, and 6.4 dissenting
opinions. The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV 111, 340 (1995).
The 1993 Term produced 87 full opinions, 82 concurring opinions, and 65 dissenting opinions.
The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 372 (1994). The 1992
Term produced 114 full opinions, 63 concurring opinions, and 81 dissenting opinions. The
Supreme Court, 1992 Term: Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 372 (1993). The 1991 Term
produced 116 full opinions, 75 concurring opinions, and 89 dissenting opinions. The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term: Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 177, 378 (1992). The 1990 Term produced
120 full opinions, 47 concurring opinions, and 95 dissenting opinions. The Supreme Court, 1990
Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 419 (1991).
An example of a dissenting opinion in a case with large ramifications is Justice John Paul
Stevens' 31 page dissent in Printz v. U.S., the Brady Gun Control case, in which he rebuts every
point in Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinon. 521 U.S. 898, 939-70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). An example of a concurring opinion in a case with large ramifications is Washington v.
Glucksberg, the assisted suicide case, in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a concur-
rence qualifying the majority's opinion by warning that the case did not mean there was a consti-
tutional right to a physician's aid in dying. 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
227. See O'BRIEN, supra note 226, at 284.
228. See Gordon Wood, The Father of the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1997, at 41.
229. See id.
230. Some commentators have even suggested that clerks are the source to blame for the
proliferation of separate opinions. See CRIsIs AND REFORM, supra note 44, at 102-19; Erwin N.
Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts, 32
CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 799 (1983).
231. See infra notes 285-299 and accompanying text.
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2. Modern "Circuit-Riding:"232 Lectures, Speeches, Books, Articles
Increasingly, sitting Justices publish books and articles and lecture
around the world on important legal issues. 233 The Justices also travel
to attend judicial conferences. Many have ventured overseas under
the sponsorship of various educational, governmental, or nonprofit
groups. Some commentators have criticized the Justices for participa-
tion in these activities. 234 However, overall attendance at these events
seems beneficial to our judicial system because it allows judges to en-
232. "The Judiciary Act of 1789 required that the justices of the Supreme Court serve also as
judges of the circuit courts." Kermit L. Hall, Circuit Riding, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 145 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). The Justices
complained that circuit riding diverted them from more important duties. Id. The practice was
ended by Congress in 1911. Id.
233. See, e.g., REHNOUIST, supra note 60; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Harry A. Blackmun, The First Amendment and Its Religion
Clauses: Where Are We? Where Are We Going?, 14 NOVA L. REV. 29 (1989); William J. Brennan,
Jr., Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1994); Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitu-
tional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313
(1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 473 (1973); Warren E. Burger, The High Cost of Prison Tuition, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 903
(1986); William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949); 0. W. Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Anthony M. Kennedy, Judicial Ethics and the
Rule of Law, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1067 (1996); Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Pen-
alty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1986); Sandra
Day O'Connor, Address, The Life of the Law: Principles of Logic and Experience From the
United States the Fairchild Lecture, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1; Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreward: The
Establishment Clause and Endorsement of Religion, 8 J. L. & RELIGION 1 (1990); Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., Carolone Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982); William H. Rehnquist, The
Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 903 (1991); William H.
Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1985);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine
of Standing As An Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881
(1983); John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293 (1993); John Paul Ste-
vens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121 (1993); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a
Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1983); Byron R. White, The Work of the Supreme Court:
A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST. B. J. 346 (1982).
234. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 204 (criticizing Chief Justice Burger's
tendency to spread himself thin by attending too may social, speaking, and ceremonial engage-
ments); John Marshall Fritz & Tony Mauro, Supreme Court: 'Is It More Equal?' Laws Difficult to
Apply to the high court, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 1992, at Al (reporting on Justice Scalia's speech
regarding the Constitution at a function sponsored by the Kentucky Bar Association and the
University of Kentucky law school); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Justices Enjoy Benefits,
Financial Records Show Appointees Take Advantage of Travel Perks, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 23,
1993, at Ul (revealing the large amount of travel taken by the Justices for speaking engage-
ments); Neil A. Lewis, Justice Thomas Assails Victim Mentality, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1994, at
A14 (commenting on Justice Thomas' speech before the Federalist Society and the Manhattan
Institute).
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gage in contact with others holding diverse viewpoints. These events
typically occur during the Supreme Court's off-season and certainly
help serve the future of the law. Nonetheless, when held during the
Term, these functions can become time consuming and lessen time
that could be spent on opinion-writing.
3. Anecdotes: "Like sands through the hourglass ....
Several anecdotes exist regarding what busy judges really do. One
famous anecdote concerned Justice Thurgood Marshall's television
habits within his chambers. Legend says that Justice Marshall spent
more time watching afternoon soap operas in his office than working
on cases.235 Justice Marshall was also notorious for talking for hours
to his clerks about his war stories. 236 When meeting with Justice Mar-
shall, the clerks would often try to leave one at a time so that they
could return to their awaiting work.237
While such stories may be rooted in gossip rather than truth, they
carry a certain weight in assessing the work product of courts. At the
very least, these stories contribute something important to our image
of the judicial system.238 Furthermore, perceptions can often far ex-
ceed reality. A new reality can be born from false impressions. Mis-
perceptions can have very real negative consequences for the judicial
process. As the image of clerk-as-judge grows, the more judges-and
clerks may come to accept the notion that this structure is sound.239
The more judges defer their opinion-writing responsibility, the easier
it may become to defer the important function of decision-making.
235. See Terry Eastland, While Justice Sleeps, NAT'L REV., Apr. 21, 1989, at 24. See also
LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 278 (confirming that "Marshall spent more time watching afternoon
soaps in his office than working on cases"); JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,
JR. 260 (1994) (remarking that "[olpinion writing did not interest [Justice Thurgood Marshall]
.... Marshall himself spent hours each day telling stories and watching daytime television.., he
enjoyed a reputation outside the Court for scholarly opinions, but inside the Court, he often
seemed uninformed and disengaged").
236. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 196-97 (accusing Justice Thurgood
Marshall of spending hours telling stories about his early life and litigation experiences, prevent-
ing his clerks from doing their work).
237. See id.
238. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
239. See Kester, supra note 24, at 20 ("Law clerks have invaded the judicial system, affecting
the law, the profession, the judiciary and the public.").
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C. Who Should Be Concerned... And Why?
1. Practitioners
Each word, 240 each phrase, each sentence, each page-an attorney
busily performs surgery on opinions in search of constructions that
will assist their clients. Written opinions are the foundation of impor-
tant and far-reaching legal structures, such as precedent and stare de-
cisis. A written opinion reflects the past and makes the future more
predictable. Opinions also provide guidance to the lower courts.
Whoever writes an opinion faces the prospect that his or her word
choice will have a far-reaching and lasting impact on legal doctrine,
such as in Carolene Products.241
Consequently, clerk-written opinions may not provide an accurate
gauge for attorneys to predict what a court would likely decide in a
future case.242 Indeed, the extent to which a particular expression in
240. Words are important to the law because of the concept of stare decisis. Justice Douglas
has suggested perhaps this should not always be the case. He stated, "[w]ell I've always thought
that on a constitutional decision, that stare decisis, that is, established law, was really no sure
guideline because what did the guys do-the judges who sat there in 1875-know about, say, elec-
tronic surveillance? They didn't know anything about it.... Why take their wisdom?" Dorothy
J. Glancy, Douglas's Right of Privacy: A Response to His Critics, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS
WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 175 n.66 (Stephen L. Wasby ed.,
1990). Justice Douglas suggested that the law survives because it adapts to changing situations.
Douglas, stitfa note 233, at 746. He believed it was a "healthy practice" for a court to "reexam-
ine its own doctrine." Id.
Other testimonials of the importance of words are telling: "[Clerks wield] the enormous power
of the first draft and, specifically, in the selection of words, structure, and materials, that clerks
may exercise their greatest influence .... Rarely do the Justices disassemble the drafts they've
been given to examine the crucial choices that went into their design." LAZARUS, supra note 8,
at 273. "Every time an opinion came down, some lawyer found an ambiguity ... [leading to]
another round of quibbling." WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 44. "Every word
counts in a Supreme Court opinion, and too many of those words are clerk words." We Did
Seriously Exacerbate the Divisions, NAT'L L.J., June 1, 1998, at A10. "[Tihe reasoning and word-
ing of the opinions-pored over for years to come by lawyers and judges-often are shaped by
clerks." Marquand, supra note 8, at 1.
241. See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
242. See Holmes, supra note 233, at 461 (proposing that law is a prediction of what courts will
do). An appropriate anecdote is as follows:
One of the issues that [Justice Thurgood] Marshall enjoyed arguing with his clerks was
the question of what was obscene. He loved to take conservative positions with them,
maintaining that anything hard-core could be and should be totally banned. What was
so important about it? First Amendment principles are not at stake in this case, he
would bellow. Dirty pictures are. What about his liberal opinion for the Court in Stan-
ley? his clerks would ask. He had meant only to protect people's privacy in their own
homes, he would claim with a grin. Publishers, distributors, sellers could be stopped.
But, a clerk once pointed out, "You said that the right to privacy must go further than
the home."
"No," Marshall retorted. He had never said that.
Yes, the clerk insisted.
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an opinion can be attributed to the named Justice is unclear.243
Although the Justices give clerks general directives on what to include
in an opinion, the details are typically produced solely by clerks.244
Ironically, these "details" are the sources of contention for academics
and attorneys.245 A classic example is the famous footnote four in
Carolene Products.246 Recognizing the clerk's role in creating this im-
portant footnote, one begins to appreciate the scope of the potential
consequences of clerk opinion-writing. Certainly, accountability
would be clearer if Justice Harlan had alone written footnote four. If
authorship were clear, when legal academics, historians, and other in-
terested parties read Carolene Products, they would be able to accu-
rately assemble reasons why it was written and assess the intent
behind the author's words. Without first knowing who wrote the fa-
mous words, it is difficult to make an honest attempt at answering the
important question of "why."
However, clerk-written opinions do face some accountability.
While Supreme Court clerks are absent from the historically secret
decision-making conferences, 247 a Justice must instruct their clerks on
the ideas discussed in the conference and give the clerk a general di-
rection for the draft opinion.248 Generally, a Justice edits a clerk's
No, never, Marshall was sure. "Show me."
The clerk brought the bound opinions.
Marshall read the relevant section.
"That's not my opinion, that's the opinion of [a clerk from the prior term]," he
declared.
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 197-98. See also Letter from Judge Charles E.
Wyznanski, Jr. to Bethuel M. Webster (Feb. 6, 1958), reprinted in Bethuel M. Webster & William
H. Hogeland, Jr., The Economist in Chambers and in Court, 12 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 50, 67
(1958) ("[A]ny time any judge uses a first-rate law clerk there is always a kindred danger the law
clerk by force of his distinction of mind and youthful energy may play a more decisive role than
the parties to a case cherish.").
243. See Mark Tushnet, Themes In Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 771
(1995) ("Indeed, the extent to which the particular expressions in the opinions can be attributed
to the Justices is quite unclear-few of the Warren Court Justices drafted the opinions that ap-
peared under their names.").
244. See id. at 771 ("Though they usually gave their law clerks general directives about what
to include in the opinions, the details-which are the source for the sophisticated elaborations by
legal academics and political theorists-were typically produced by the law clerks.").
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
247. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 28 (writing that "[a]t every stage, with the exception of the
Justices' private conference, the clerks had some role to play...").
248. The conference has been criticized for the lack of debate that has taken place, particu-
larly in more recent times. Judge Wald sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. She has recognized that on her court
senior judges tend not to . .. spend time explaining or even justifying their votes to
colleagues. New judges on the other hand are often disappointed at the absence of
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work before it is circulated, under the Justice's name, to the other
Justices. 249 Subsequently, the other Justices, or their clerks, review
the opinion and offer suggestions before adoption.250 Some scholars
contend that multiple pairs of eyes reviewing an opinion provide an
adequate safeguard to justify clerk opinion-writing.251 They argue
that other Justices would not join an opinion if a clerk did not appro-
priately represent the Court's decision. 252 However, despite a Jus-
tice's careful instructions and editing, the initial drafter of an opinion
holds substantial influence over the finished product. The author of
the initial draft enjoys great deference. More often than not, the bulk
of what was originally written is maintained, without changes. 253
Litigants should be comfortable in the knowledge that their fate
rests with a proper judicial officer.254 However, an attorney who be-
lieves a clerk played an improper role may face many hurdles in cor-
recting the problem. A litigant who complains about a clerk's
participation may have his or her complaint fall on deaf ears. The
judge may believe the challenge is a personal insult.255 For example,
in one case, a judge wrote, "Mr. Allen [the clerk] is troubled by the
slur on his integrity. The implicit slur on its judgment troubles the
Court. The Court is further troubled by the inference that the motion
was not decided by an Article III judge. It was. ' 256 A complaint
about a clerk could cause a party to suffer due to underlying
prejudices of a judge who feels he is not trusted by that party. In light
long, scholarly, post-argument conferences, and even shocked when their seniors at
conference state a bottom-line position, and leave it at that.
Patricia M. Wald, Collegiality on a Court, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 521, 524 (1993).
249. See CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 145.
250. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 62 (referring to Tompkins v. Texas, 486 U.S. 1004 (1988)).
251. See Little, supra note 58, at 120-22.
252. See id.
253. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 272 (describing the "hands-off" way the Justices would
edit the clerks' drafts); CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 145 (admitting that "it is
generally true that whoever does the basic drafting of a document will have a big impact on the
final product"); Mahoney, supra note 36, at 339 (stating that "the initial drafter will have a
substantial influence on the ultimate work product"); Diana Gribbon Motz, A Federal Judge's
View of Richard A. Posner's The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1029, 1035 (1998) (stating that whoever writes the opinion generally forms the approach
taken in the opinion); Abby F. Rudzin & Lisa Greenfield, Ten Brief-Writing Don'ts-The Judi-
cial Clerk's Perspective, 85 ILL. B.J. 285, 285 (1997) (explaining that when drafting opinions, the
"person who gets to take the first crack at it (i.e., the law clerk) may influence the outcome").
254. Bishop v. Albertson's, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Wash. 1992) ("It is important that
litigants appreciate that decisions are made by a constitutional judicial officer.").
255. See id. at 901. See Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1988)
("It is important that judges not feel their discretion has in any sense been delegated or their
judgment impaired by soliciting and considering input from their clerks.").
256. Bishop, 806 F. Supp. at 902.
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of these hurdles, clerks must use their position to remedy possible
problems.
2. Historians and Judicial Biographers: "This Justice Was A Great
Jurist Because In This Opinion His Clerk Wrote. .... "
Concurrently, a judge's writing is of great importance to legal schol-
ars, particularly to historians and judicial biographers. Judicial biogra-
phies have earned a significant market in the nonfiction world. In
creating a judicial biography, one of the key measurements of great-
ness is the quality of a judge's opinions. 257 Published opinions, at
times, are the sole avenue available to begin to understand the think-
ing and life of a judge. What a person writes conveys a great amount
about how that individual thinks. If judges cease writing their own
opinions, one of the greatest sources for historians and biographers to
judge judges will be skewed.
Current historians and judicial biographers seem compelled to in-
terview former clerks to obtain a clearer picture of the subject Justice
and his or her place in history.258 However, relying on the perspective
of clerks may contribute to the creation of a different historical pic-
ture. The closeness of the judge-clerk relationship certainly may elicit
a more personal feeling than the cold published jurisprudence. 259 Fur-
thermore, with increased opinion-writing by clerks, future historians
257. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Art Of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1595, 1626
(1995) (defining quality as encompassing the correctness of the judge's opinion, as well as the
craftsmanship, creativity, influence, and durability). A recent quote from Lazarus also demon-
strates how important opinions are in assessing the greatness of a Justice. Lazarus wrote, "[i]n
30 years, there is scarcely a line of doctrine, area of law, legal test or even memorable phrase that
one can associate with [Justice] White." Edward Lazarus, A Biography of Former Supreme
Court Justice Byron White That's Equal To Its Subject-And Then Some, CHI. TRIa., Aug. 30,
1998, § 14, at 9.
258. Prominent legal scholar and historian Bernard Schwartz often pursued interviews with
the Justices' current and former clerks. See Wolfgang Saxon, Bernard Schwartz Dies at 74; Legal
Scholar and Historian, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1997, at D7. Even novelist Brad Meltzer inter-
viewed clerks before writing his book. See Tony Mauro, For lawyers, clerkship is ultimate job,
USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 13A. Clerks have been criticized for viewing themselves as too
powerful within the judicial process. See David R. Fine, Lex, Lies, and Audiotape, 96 W. VA. L.
REv. 449, 459-60 (1993-1994) (book review). Likewise, some criticize scholars who interview
clerks to gather information. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His
Supreme Court: A Judicial Biography, 72 CAL. L. REV. 275, 281 (1984) (book review) (criticizing
Bernard Schwartz for using law clerks as sources in the biography). However, one of the key
issues that should be addressed in a judicial biography is whether clerks have influenced the
judge. Gerhardt, supra note 257, at 1611.
259. See Lance Liebman, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 13, 13-14
(1993) (stating that "law clerks can be perfect celebrants of a retired judge, but they may be less
reliable as analysts of his judicial contribution" because the "year of intimate observation and
personal contact may create an emotional lens that distorts clear perception of the published
jurisprudence").
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and biographers, who may not have the option of interviewing former
clerks, will have to turn to published opinions to understand their sub-
ject. These consumers will have incomplete materials to assess their
subject. The historian and biographer must continuously ask: Is this
what the judge thought? Did this opinion receive editing from the
judge? Did the clerk influence the outcome, the wording, the style?
Today, without access to a judge's papers or interviews with his or her
clerks, historic and biographic interpretation could become a more
difficult process.
Some clerks have intimate knowledge of how a judge thinks issues
through and whether the judge actually wrote their underlying
thoughts or deferred to the clerk's pen. Perhaps that is why former
clerks have begun to corner the market on publishing judicial biogra-
phies.260 Furthermore, as mentioned, non-clerk authors have been in-
terviewing former clerks of the judge in order to paste together a
more complete picture.261 Seeing the perspective of a law clerk, either
through interviews or clerks' writings, allows readers to obtain an in-
sider's look at this mysterious institution. However, the increasing in-
ability to understand a judge through his opinions, because of the
blurred lines of authorship, robs biographers of an important analyti-
cal tool.262 A judicial biographer, who either does not have access to
260. Dennis Hutchinson recently published a biography of Justice White. DENNIS J. HUTCH-
INSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE (1998). Hutchinson clerked for Justice
White during the 1975 term. Robert S. Peck, An Enigma Wrapped in a Mystery (visited Nov. 11,
1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbook/reviews.htm>. Justice White refused to cooperate in his
former clerk's biographical project. Id. In fact, when asked upon retirement whether Justice
White planned to pen his memories, he indicated that he already had done so in the volumes
reporting the decisions he had written over the years. Id.
Andrew Kaufman wrote a biography of the famous Justice Cardozo. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN,
CARDOZO (1998). Joseph Rauh, Justice Cardozo's last clerk, and Justice Frankfurter asked An-
drew Kaufman to undertake Justice Cardozo's biography. Id. at ix. Kaufman was a former clerk
to Justice Frankfurter. Id.
Mark Tushnet authored a more general biography of Justice Thurgood Marshall's time on the
Court. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991 (1997). Tushnet clerked for Justice Marshall during the 1972-1973
term. Id. at viii. However, Tushnet decided not to "systematically interview law clerks" in pen-
ning this biography because he believed clerks would have provided little insight due to their
short tenure at the Supreme Court. Id.
John Jeffries authored a biography of Justice Powell. JEFFRIES, supra note 235. Jeffries for-
merly clerked for Justice Powell. Id. at ix. In preparation for the book, Jeffries had access to
Justice Powell's papers and held interviews with his family, friends, law partners, and other for-
mer clerks. Id.
261. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
262. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 58 (former clerks discussed details about the writing of cases,
including Brown v. Board of Education); ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL
WARREN 532 (1997) (interviewed 45 former law clerks of Justice Warren during his research
giving readers a deeper look at the Court's decision-making process and who wrote first and
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former clerks or who does not want to interview former clerks, is
merely left with written opinions to develop his or her work. By rely-
ing solely on opinions, a historian or biographer is left to guess at
whose thoughts, the judges or the clerks, were enshrined on the paper.
Aside from judicial biographies, writing is important to the field of
history in general. If judges did not write opinions, society would not
be able to trace the evolution of our nation's mores. The law dis-
pensed by a court in writing is a projection of societal values. When
we evaluate a judicial opinion, not only do we begin to understand the
individual jurist, but we begin to understand ourselves and our na-
tion's history. Through the words of judges, a history emerges in
which racial segregation was the natural state of affairs,2 63 freedom of
contract prevailed over health and safety conditions,264 war dictated a
person's liberty,265 penumbras provided privacy,266 and interracial
couples were told to live separately.267 Judges have recorded, and
continue to record, our history, through their eyes, in their opinions.
To fully understand a judge's perspective on our history, it is impera-
tive to know which words on the paper were actually the judge's.
3. The Public: Do People Want To See Behind The Curtain?
Some political theories propagate that democratic-type nations
function optimally with an informed public. But, does the public care
whether clerks write opinions instead of judges? Judge Richard Pos-
ner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
argued that "Americans do not respect writers anyway, [and] take it
for granted that every great figure has a ghostwriter, and in short
could not care less whether Supreme Court justices or any other
judges write their own opinions or have their clerks write them, pro-
vided [the] judges decide the outcome. '2 68 What is the purpose of
opinion-writing if we proceed on the notion that Americans do not
care? While many Americans may not care, they should. And, even if
society does not care, a just system should be maintained by those
who do. Perhaps one day more people will care. In fact, a narrower
final drafts); HUTCHINSON, supra note 260, at 6, 340, 349, 352, 374-75, 406, 424, 447, 454, 471, 472
(relying heavily on interviews with one of Justice White's first law clerks, Rex. E. Lee).
263. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
264. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
265. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
266. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
267. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
268. CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 143. See Grey, supra note 209, at 5 (arguing
that the language used by judges is not important because "[i]t is the decisions that count, not
how they are put").
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group of Americans, namely practitioners, legal historians, and biog-
raphers, do care.
Certainly, the public has access to the knowledge that clerks play a
role in our courts. The Brethren and its progeny have given the read-
ing public a powerful image of how clerks operate within judicial
chambers. The press surrounding Closed Chambers focused on Laza-
rus' claims of clerk misconduct. 269 The image received by the public is
one of clerks usurping the Justices' power, given to them pursuant to
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. 270 De-
bating about whether this image rings true or false overlooks the ulti-
mate point.271 As previously argued, sometimes an image will endure
regardless of the truth.
Some may argue that the majority of the general public would not
have read a five hundred page plus book, such as Closed Chambers,
demonstrating the public's lack of interest in and knowledge about
judicial clerks. However, even if many did not read the book, reports
of the book have appeared on multiple popular mediums, including
the Today Show and National Public Radio.272 Newspapers have also
communicated to the public the enormous power clerks hold. The
Washington Post wrote, "[clerks] have drafted opinions and wielded
enormous influence over cases that shaped American law."' 273 The
Chicago Tribune wrote, "[i]n . . . 'Closed Chambers,' the clerks
emerge as ideological advocates who determine not only which cases
the Supreme Court will consider but also influence how justices will
vote. ' 274 The Supreme Court particularly fascinates the public be-
cause of the scant information available about the institution and the
fact that the media focuses on the Court. Those who have gotten in-
side, namely clerks, are intriguing to outsiders because of their inti-
mate knowledge of the judicial process.
269. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
270. Justice Thurgood Marshall would occasionally remind his law clerks that "[he was] the
one who was nominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson and confirmed by the Senate of the
United States . . . not you." Randall Kennedy, Fanfare for an Uncommon Man, TIME, Feb. 8,
1993, at 32.
271. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
272. See Interview with Edward Lazarus, The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 8,
1998), available in 1998 WL 5262655; Closed Chambers Scott speaks with Edward Lazarus, au-
thor of "Closed Chambers," Weekend Edition-Saturday (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 25, 1998),
available in 1998 WL 6284860; Booknotes (Nat'l Cable Satellite Corp. television broadcast, June
14, 1998), available in 1998 WL 6616055; The Osgood File (CBS radio broadcast, June 15, 1998),
available in 1998 WL 52828898.
273. Biskupic, supra note 37, at Al.
274. Wu, supra note 34, at 31.
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D. A Simple Plan
Ideally, judges should reclaim their opinion-writing duties. Judges
should stand as a positive example for the legal profession and the
public. However, given increasing constraints, clerks should respond
to help safeguard the appearance of justice. Former Supreme Court
clerk Edward Lazarus charged that clerks mirrored and exacerbated
the polarization and partisanship among the Supreme Court Jus-
tices. 275 If this claim is true, clerks should cease mimicking these poor
examples. The bulk of the tasks performed by clerks are not im-
proper. Judges should and must depend on their clerks to work in
many capacities given the historic closeness of the judge-clerk rela-
tionship.276 Instead of writing the first draft of an opinion, a clerk
should become the editor and reviser of the judge's initial draft.
When this suggestion is not practical, clerks should restrain them-
selves in acting as judges, steer their role back to a more traditional
sounding board, and, if writing opinions is inevitable, write opinions
which truly serve consumers of the law.
1. Don't Let Playing "Puny" Judge Go Too Far
"It is important that law clerks not be carried away with delusions
of authority they do not have. '277 Clerks are young and ambitious.
Most have attended the top legal institutions and have built impres-
sive resumes.2 78 The competition for the selection of the best clerks
indicates the level to which judges defer their authority to clerks.
Judges want clerks who will make them look more impressive in their
written opinions. Likewise, clerks want the cachet of being published
under the pseudonym of their judge. Many clerks have openly ac-
knowledged their underlying desire to act as a "puny" judge.2 79
Testimonials by clerks indicate that they have been more than will-
ing to fill the shoes of their superiors. One former clerk has acknowl-
edged that "[tihe goal (or perhaps dream) of every law clerk that
worked for the Judge in those initial years was to get a draft opinion
by him relatively unchanged. 12 80 Yet another clerk explained that
"[y]ou go back to your office, you take a deep breath, you stare at
your computer screen, and you go, 'Holy shit, I'm going to write the
275. See LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 190.
276. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
277. Bishop v. Albertson's, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
278. See supra note 34-35 and accompanying text.
279. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 81.
280. Id. at 81.
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law of the land.'" 281 Meltzer's book also mimics these testimonials.
One of the fictional clerks exclaimed to the other when their first
opinion was published, "I can't believe it! These are our words! This
is the law!"282 These feelings are wholly understandable because such
power at such an early stage in a career can be very seductive.
Lazarus' book, Closed Chambers, details instances of overreaching
by clerks. Some vocal commentators have criticized Lazarus for rely-
ing on incidents exclusively from the "law clerk rumor mill" and not
grounding his analysis in reality.283 Nonetheless, Lazarus has un-
doubtedly made an impression on society's views of clerks because his
book has been read by many. Whether the stories he told are factu-
ally accurate is an important consideration, but it is equally important
to consider how deep of an impact his views will have on the role of
clerks. 284 However, Meltzer's novel, The Tenth Justice, is inherently
different than The Brethren and Closed Chambers because it is fiction.
Although merely a novel, Meltzer's book should also trigger deep
concern about the public image of judicial clerks. The recent surge in
the popularity of legal novels means that books, such as The Tenth
Justice, are read by many Americans outside the legal community.
The publication and popularity of Meltzer's novel indicates quite a bit
about the image that the public may hold of clerks.
2. The Sounding Board Re-Born
Clerks make crucial choices about which facts and legal precedent
to spotlight in an opinion.285 By delegating the drafting of opinions,
Justices miss out on the rethinking and re-examination of their views
that flow from having to wrestle with the task of writing. Law clerks
have been blamed for many "evils," from influencing decisions to aid-
ing in the uncontrollable proliferation of the United States Reports.286
Therefore, a transformation of image is in order. To lighten the bur-
den on the bookcases of law libraries and law firms, clerks should help
alleviate the growing number of unnecessary concurring and dissent-
281. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 146 (1994).
282. MELTZER, supra note 4, at 43-44.
283. O'BRIEN, supra note 226, at 214 (cautioning readers about the accuracy of Lazarus'
sources and factual errors); Floyd Abrams, Trivializing the Supreme Court, FORTUNE, Mar. 10,
1980, at 129 (criticizing The Brethren's focus on law clerks); Alex Kozinski, Worthy of Trust?
(visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revjun98.htm> (claiming that Lazarus
and his sources are unreliable).
284. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
286. CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 146-47; KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 349-
50. See infra notes 300-307.
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ing opinions.287 Certainly, some are necessary and helpful to the law's
consumers. There would be a very different jurisprudential landscape
if Justice Holmes had not been a Great Dissenter.288 Generally, a
clerk should question the judge about whether writing separately will
accomplish a justifiable goal by asking: would this opinion add some-
thing of substance to the law? Along these lines, clerks should engage
their judge with any concerns he or she has regarding the boundaries
of their responsibilities. By opening the door of communication, the
lines and boundaries of the relationship can begin to be more fully
defined. Open communication would also preserve the individuality
of each judge and clerk in this close relationship and stave off some of
the fears of bureaucratization. 289
Some commentators have correlated the increase in the number of
clerks with the "spirit of separatism that is reflected in the splintering
of judicial opinions. '290 Passages in The Brethren suggest that clerks
are bearers of gossip and informal messages among the Justices'
chambers. 291 Thus, clerks should use these communication opportuni-
ties to, at a minimum, mend the gaps that create unnecessary concur-
ring opinions. A clerk could use his or her position to incorporate the
other Justices' ideas into the opinion of the assigned writer. These
attempts may help reduce the number of pages published and also
foster more collegiality. Perhaps a return to the sounding board
model will bring the unanimity found in the opinions published be-
tween 1811-1823.292
Naturally, the closeness of the clerk-judge relationship is a hurdle to
a clerk's individual action. A clerk does not want to step on judicial
toes. Instead of fostering conversation, a clerk may fear his or her
remarks may lead the judge to lose trust in the clerk. Furthermore,
women and minority clerks may feel uneasy questioning their judge
because these groups have historically been under-represented in the
287. See infra notes 300-307 and accompanying text.
288. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469-71 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
289. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
290. KRONMAN, supra note 218, at 351.
291. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 51 (explaining how Justice Marshall sent a
clerk to talk to Justice Harlan's clerk to see if a compromise could be reached in a Mississippi
desegregation case). See TUSHNET, supra note 260, at 57 (describing how the "clerk grapevine"
lets the Justices know the thinking of the other chambers); Marquand, supra note 8, at 1 (report-
ing that clerks "act as ambassadors among nine chambers that are often compared to nine differ-
ent nation-states").
292. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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clerkship role.293 These individuals would not want to jeopardize fu-
ture access to clerkships. Trust in the relationship is necessary be-
cause the judge opens up to the clerk a full view of his life and his
decision-making process. Conversely, the judge may refrain from crit-
ically editing a clerk's work out of a sense of loyalty.294 A judge may
forego accommodating a colleague's suggestions about a draft opinion
so as not to risk insulting their clerk. A clerk should challenge these
instincts.
Since a position as a clerk is highly sought after, few clerks want to
risk jeopardizing a near guarantee of continued professional acco-
lades.295 Generally, clerks desire to please the judge for whom they
work. Few clerks would be inclined to formally complain about their
judge. Serious claims by clerks against judges have been filed spar-
ingly. Only a mere handful of clerks have fied sexual harassment
claims against judges.296 When clerks have complained, the judges
have received "nothing more than a censure, reprimand, or admonish-
ment. '297 If claims by clerks as substantial as sexual harassment have
not been taken seriously, it is unlikely that a complaint would be
raised that a judge improperly deferred opinion-writing to the clerk.
An example of what might occur if a clerk formally complained is
displayed in the Sheppard opinion.298 Judge Beerman had ordered his
law clerk to draft a decision; the clerk refused and was fired.299 Ac-
cording to the facts of the case, the relationship between the judge and
clerk seemed to be sour for some time. However, this case raises an
293. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
294. On the subject of loyalty, one commentator wrote:
Moreover - I base this on the word of a very recent law clerk - the natural loyalty of
employers to those who work for them frequently leads Justices to resist even small
alterations of draft opinions to accommodate the views of their colleagues after circula-
tion of draft opinions inside the Court. That, in turn, partly accounts for the extreme
fragmentation that now characterizes (and weakens) the Court's utterances.
LusKY, supra note 58, at 156. Clerks are not the only ones to be faulted with romanticizing their
clerkship. Judges may hold the same rosy outlook.
Of the ten clerks the Court has employed over the past twelve years, each has displayed
discrete strengths and weaknesses, but there has not been a bad one in the bunch. All
have been conscientious in their work habits, unflagging in their devotion to expedition
of the Court's calendar, and thoroughly honorable in their approach to ethical
considerations.
Bishop v. Albertson's, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
295. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
296. See Marina Angel, Sexual Harassment By Judges, 45 U. MiAMI L. REV. 817, 817 (1991)
(emphasizing that the legal response to sexual harassment by judges has been disproportionately
low compared to the magnitude of the problem).
297. Id.
298. See supra notes 177-185 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
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important consideration. A clerk's position is a very delicate one be-
cause he or she walks a tightrope between pleasing the judge and serv-
ing society. From this case, it may be a safe conclusion that many law
clerks would not formally complain about their judge. In light of this,
clerks must maneuver within chambers to help create a more con-
sumer-minded judicial process.
3. Write Consumer-Minded Opinions
"The mass of the law is, to be sure, accumulating with an almost
incredible rapidity .... It is impossible not to look without some
discouragement upon the ponderous volumes, which the next half
century will add to the groaning shelves of our jurists. ''3° While it is
an American tradition that a judge becomes great via his or her writ-
ten opinions,30 1 some commentators have trumpeted the demise of the
old Holmes model of opinion-writing. 30 2 Today's "Editor-Justice"
lacks the distinctive voice of the great Justices of the past.30 3 Re-
cently, some scholars have argued that being a great writer is not sy-
nonymous with being a great judge. 3°4 Certainly, judges are not
required to be Holmes-like to faithfully and honestly serve the law's
consumers. Courts simply need to write and publish clearer, shorter
opinions.30 5 Perhaps judges believe they do not have time to write
300. Joseph Story, Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, in THE MISCEL-
LANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 237 (William W. Story ed., 1972).
301. For a cross cultural perspective consider Switzerland. Swiss judges generally do not write
their opinions. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court: The Clerks and the Personal Assistants of the
Judges (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.admin.ch/tf/e/intro/greffier.htm>. Instead, a legally
trained clerk engages in debate with the judge and crafts the opinions. Id. This role stems from
a time in Swiss history when clerks were the only legally trained people in the court system. Id.
302. See CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 151 (surmising that "[t]he growth in the
size-and quality-of the federal judiciary will make it more difficult for any modem judge to
achieve the prominence of the famous judges of earlier times..
303, Id. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
304. "But I want to deny that literary distinction is a necessary condition for judicial excel-
lence. There have been good, even great judges who wrote without distinction, or who let the
law clerks do the writing .... " Grey, supra note 209, at 6.
305. See supra notes 300-304 and accompanying text; see infra notes 306-307 and accompany-
ing text. One commentator said:
[a]ll one needs to do is to read the heavily footnoted, citation laden, characterless, ap-
pellate opinions prevalent today to be convinced that these are the work of intelligent
and careful, but inexperienced, lawyers... compare the opinions of a single judge from
year to year to discern obvious differences in style and approach that can only signal a
new author or authors.
Motz, supra note 253, at 1034. Yet another scholar wrote that the reliance on clerks in opinion-
drafting has resulted in opinions which are "all too frequently prolix, unimaginative, indecisive,
and less credible." Monaghan, supra note 44, at 347. Finally, one scholar determined that "the
time of our clerks is spent merely in seeking felicitous expression, adding citations and attempt-
ing to produce works of art. It would be worthwhile for judges to experiment with much simpler
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opinions because they desire to be Holmes-esque. Generally, judges
only speak to the public through their opinions. Opinions do not need
to be linguistic art to adequately serve the public. Romanticism aside,
literary distinction is not a prerequisite for producing good judging. A
judge's greatness should be demonstrated when he or she honestly
wrestles with the issues and facts and then writes clearly on the issues
presented. The primary function of written opinions should be to in-
form the law's consumers.
In the final analysis, judicial clerks will probably continue to write
opinions. Clerks should acknowledge the damages of the prolifera-
tion of unnecessary opinions and exhibit self-restraint by writing
shorter and clearer opinions. Clerk-written opinions often are littered
with legal jargon and arcane footnotes. Clerks seem to be writing
opinions for different reasons than opinions have been written for in
the past. Clerks are typically editors of their law schools' journals.
Rather than crafting opinions that are useful to a practitioner or to
serve the law, clerks seem to write opinions to justify their position to
law reviews.3°6 To temper this situation, clerks must stop and contem-
plate who will be the consumer of this opinion before placing their
fingers on the keyboard. Practitioners and the public are more inter-
ested in six pages of reasoning by an experienced judge than forty
pages full of citations, precedent, and footnotes sent out under the
judge's name.30 7 Furthermore, if opinions are shortened, then per-
haps judges will be more capable of reclaiming some of the first draft
writing.
As previously discussed, three judge-clerk relationship models seem
to have emerged from the past: (1) the sounding board; (2) the mirror;
and (3) the judge.308 Caseload proliferation has arguably overruled
the role of clerk as mere sounding board. This romantic role may
seem too impractical in the media age. The mirror model may also be
opinion models." Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reform: How the United States Courts of Ap-
peals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 928-29 (1995).
306. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 9, at 89 (stating that "Justices are writing not just for the
litigants but for all those who are to be affected by the rights and principles they are resolving
and declaring").
307. See Paul M. Bator, What's Wrong With the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 697
(1990) (accusing the Supreme Court of not serving consumers of the law and challenging them to
provide clear, usable guidelines, and their lawyers with readily applicable doctrine that can be
reliably invoke in litigation); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Art of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1595, 1630 (1995) (explaining how Justice Black wrote for the public, the ultimate benefici-
ary of the Court's work); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 133, 133 (1990) (urging her colleagues to exercise greater restraint before writing separate
opinions to improve collegiality and the clarity and predictability).
308. See supra notes 71-142 and accompanying text.
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dead because of the sheer volume of work delegated to clerks. A
clerk is unable to spend enough quality time with his or her judge to
enable him or her to truly mirror the judge's style. Even if a clerk was
to glimpse at opinions from previous years in hopes of mirroring his or
her boss, he or she would only find reflections of past clerks. This
would create clerks mirroring clerks, mirroring clerks, mirroring
judges. Finally, the judge model is unacceptable because of the need
for accountability, intellectual honesty, and judicial integrity.
A cycle has crystallized and will probably continue to turn. Clerks
write opinions, law reviews critique opinions, clerks shape opinions to
please law reviews to invoke less criticism, opinions grow increasingly
convoluted in their justifications, practitioners wallow in confusion,
more litigation ensues, and thus, more cases arise in which opinions
must be written. Clerks have the opportunity to alleviate some of
these problems and their consequences, given their unique position
within "closed chambers." Therefore, clerks should engage this great
opportunity.
III. IMPACT
The proposition of enlarging the federal judiciary to deal with rising
caseloads has been contemplated and greatly unfavored because ad-
ding more judges translates into a diminished judicial quality.30 9
Many alternative reforms have been implemented or proposed, rang-
ing from ceasing to issue opinions in written forms to chipping away at
jurisdiction.310 These remedial avenues also have limitations. The
prospect of enlisting more clerks for duty should welcome a similar
reaction to the suggestion of appointing more judges. The practical
necessity of clerks has transformed their role since Justice Gray and
Judge Hand's day. Unless clerks take affirmative steps from within
the darkened chambers, their role may undergo drastic changes imple-
mented by outsiders. These young professionals seem to have been
delegated every function short of decision-making. As encroachment
309. Many scholars argue that hiring more federal judges would not lessen the workload nor
increase the quality of judicial work. See, e.g., CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 11, at 132-
34 (stating that "[tihe individual judge's influence and status would be significantly diminished
by such numerosity"); Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judici-
ary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 187-88 (1993) (urging the limitation of the federal judiciary to 1000
judges to avoid an inability to perform designated tasks); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, We Don't Need
More Federal Judges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at A19 (stating that increasing the number of
federal judges will increase issues of inefficiency, litigiousness, and intrusiveness).
310. See Robert G. Vaughn, Normative Controversies Underlying Contemporary Debates
About Civil Justice Reform: A Way of Talking About Bureaucracy and the Future of the Federal
Courts, 76 DENv. U. L. REV. 217 (1998).
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upon the judicial function deepens, new standards may be imposed by
outsiders, especially on Supreme Court clerks.
As clerk participation within chambers increases, opinion-writers
may be tempted to reference the role of clerks more candidly and
more frequently in published majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions. 31' Perhaps judges will follow the bold step of concurring
with their clerks on the face of opinions.312 Mentioning clerks in opin-
ions would possibly hold judges more accountable and perhaps serve
as a deterrence to delegating responsibilities too greatly. The consum-
ers of legal opinions would also be in a better position to evaluate not
only the reasoning but also to question any improper procedures un-
dertaken by the judge or clerk. Historians and biographers would be
able to more accurately assess their subject and the level of influence
of the clerks upon the subject. However, the drawback of openly ac-
knowledging clerks is the possible erosion of respect for written opin-
ions.313 Attorneys could begin to argue the weaknesses of opinions as
controlling precedent based on the extent of a clerk's participation in
writing the opinion.
In 1958, a United States Senator had the foresight to suggest that
judicial clerks should undergo investigation, statutory qualifications,
and confirmation by the Senate.314 Certainly, if the duties of clerks
continue to blossom, this proposal may be rehashed and realized. De-
mand for clerk accountability by the law's consumers will crescendo as
more books in line with The Brethren, Closed Chambers, and The
Tenth Justice reach public consumption. As one journalist assessed,
"Lazarus' book may be even more damaging than The Brethren. '315
The publication of Lazarus' book was met with harsh criticism, and
perhaps the implication of increased insight of clerks' roles has been
the force behind this intense criticism.316 One of the most vocal critics
of Lazarus, Judge Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, has made it clear that he has "nothing but con-
tempt" 31 7 for Lazarus and will recuse himself from cases in which Laz-
311. See supra notes 186-198 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
313. Some have argued that going behind opinions can be harmful to the judicial system. See
France, supra note 3, at 38-39. Justice Powell's statement that his decision in Bowers v. Hardwick
was "probably a mistake" caused a California judge to declare that he was no longer bound by
the ruling, causing disrespect for the written law. Id. at 39.
314. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 239 (6th ed. 1993).
315. Tony Mauro, Clerk Tells Tales Out of Court, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at 7.
316. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
317. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Tightens Secrecy Rules for Clerks, USA TODAY, Nov. 9,
1998, at 1A.
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arus appears. 318 Perhaps Judge Kozinski realizes the potential
implications Lazarus' actions will have on his relationship with his
clerks, particularly in the media age.319 Lazarus' book, or the next
clerk expos6 of the mysterious judiciary, may be the catalyst that ush-
ers in a new precedent of looking closely inside judicial chambers.
Of more concern to those interested in maintaining the hermetic
nature of the Court, the position of clerks could be used as a tool to
begin rolling back the curtains on the Supreme Court stage.320 The
demand for sunshine has partly reached the United States Congress
through the medium of C-SPAN. One merely must turn on the
nightly and Sunday morning news programs to witness the increasing
effect of sunshine on the American presidency. Judges should be par-
ticularly careful about their clerks given recent harsh attacks on the
judiciary in the political arena.321 For voyeurs who are intent on pry-
ing into the mystery of the courts, the insulation of the clerks' position
may provide a serious argument for shining bright spotlights behind
the judicial curtain.322
318. See Kelly Flaherty, Client Matters: Mayer Brown, Judge Clash Over Conflict, NAT'L L.J.,
July 13, 1998, at A5.
319. Lazarus wrote the following about Judge Kozinski in his book:
Judge Alex Kozinski, for example, is uniformly recognized as one of the smartest mem-
bers of the federal bench, an outspoken conservative with a razor-sharp wit. He is also
a former clerk to both the late Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy-who was still on the Ninth Circuit when Kozinski worked for him. As part of his
own [clerk] hiring process, Kozinski is famous for organizing poker games at elite law
schools to which he invites leading clerkship contenders .... [Kozinksi has a] preference
for men as well as for members of the Federalist Society ....
LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 19-20.
320. See supra note 69.
321. See Bob Dickerson, "Let's Impeach That Damn Judge!," NEV. LAW. 6 (May 6, 1998)
(commenting on the increase in the media coverage of unpopular judicial decisions and how
more communication is needed between judges and the public); Douglas W. Hillman, Judicial
Independence: Linchpin of Our Constitutional Democracy, 76 MICH. B. J. 1300 (1997) (reporting
on recent political threats to judicial independence); Louis H. Pollak, Criticizing Judges, 79 JUDI-
CATURE 299 (1996) (writing about political attacks on judicial independence).
322. "Despite shortcomings, Closed Chambers provides an insightful airing of the musty go-
ings-on behind closed Court doors. That politicking and backbiting sometimes exist among nine
strong personalities who must share personal space for the rest of their lives ought not be a
national secret." Stephan J. Wermiel, Hear Ye, Hear Ye: Under Strict Scrutiny, Court Clerk's
Tell-All Comes Up Short Of Anything New, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 94, 94. See Edward Lazarus,
The Supreme Court Must Bear Scrutiny, WASH. POST, July 6, 1998, at A19. The results of a
recent survey asking 70 reporters who cover the Supreme Court what information they would
want to have about the Court came out as follows:
83% Oral transcripts indicating which justice is speaking
80% Written reasons for recusal
71% Televised oral arguments
70% Written reasons for denial of certorari
A COURT OF CLERKS
CONCLUSION
The relationship formed between judges and clerks has been, and
continues to be, an instrumental one in our judicial system. However,
in recent years, the image of clerks has moved away from the tradi-
tional sounding board to one of a clerk acting as a judge. This image
of a clerk usurping the power of a judge is improper and must cease to
exist. To enhance the propriety of the judicial clerk's insulated posi-
tion, clerks must question themselves and their role. If clerks do not
adjust, the law's consumers may have to act. Prying into the inner
sanctum of the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, has become
an increased activity for outsiders. Clerks should resurrect their role
as sounding boards to ensure the future integrity of the judiciary and
put their dreams of being the "tenth justice" or "puny judge" aside.
These adjustments must be made because opinions written today will
have lasting consequences on the development of the law.
Nadine J. Wichern
France, supra note 3, at 39.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:621
